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Abstract 
 
Since the founding of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been much debate 
over the effectiveness of the institution in promoting sustainable economic growth in 
countries that participate in their loan programs. This present study attempts to answer the 
question of whether the IMF has been successful in promoting economic growth by using 
a difference-in-differences analysis to examine the effects of program participation on real 
GDP growth, gross capital formation, and the unemployment rate. A sample of 177 
countries and data from the World Bank Data Bank is used to estimate the quantitative 
effect of IMF programs on these variables of interest.  My model reveals a negligible 
overall impact on growth of real GDP and gross capital formation in countries that have 
taken IMF loans.  In high-growth countries, IMF loan assistance has had an average 
positive effect on real GDP growth, and gross capital formation. In low-growth countries, 
IMF loan assistance had a smaller average positive effect on real GDP growth and gross 
capital formation. Finally, IMF participation resulted in higher unemployment rates for 
countries that exhibit both high and low average unemployment rates.  
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I. Introduction: International Relations and the IMF	
 
For this senior thesis, I am examining the role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, or, the Fund) as a promotor of sustainable growth in the international economic 
system. I begin my analysis through a discussion of the role of the IMF from an 
International Relations perspective, employing theories of International Political Economy 
scholarship and providing the historical background that lead to the creation of the 
institution. I analyze hegemonic role that the United States has played in the institution and 
in international monetary cooperation following the end of the World War II. 
I then examine the Fund from an economic perspective, employing econometric 
analysis in order to find the relationship between the IMF and economic growth in 
countries that have participated in their programs.  
The combination of International Relations and Economics in this senior thesis 
allows me to first introduce the reader to international institutions and their role in the 
international system in order to provide a better understanding of the need for such 
institutions in a world of globalized interconnected economies, where the failure of one 
state can affect all others. Then, I examine the quantitative evidence on the economic 
impact of the IMF, to see if this particular international institution is a stabilizing force for 
participating countries. 
My main hypothesis in this thesis is that when considering a large group of 
countries over an extended period of time, IMF participation leads to higher economic 
growth, higher gross capital formation, and higher employment. I more broadly ask the 
question of whether the IMF has done more good than harm, in which case the existence 
of the institutions would be justified. 
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International Relations and the IMF 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the International Monetary Fund as an 
international institution and regime and to study the role of institutions in promoting 
sustainable growth and cooperation in the international system. This chapter also helps as 
an introduction to the IMF as an institution, its origins, its mechanisms of action, its 
purpose. More broadly, the chapter asks the question of why it is in the interest of the 
international community to have such an institution in order to promote enduring economic 
growth and prevent or control financial crises, by encouraging monetary cooperation in the 
international system. The chapter seeks to add context to my economic, quantitative 
analysis of the effect of IMF lending practices on recipient countries and provide a 
historical background, as well as an analysis through the scope of International Political 
Economy (IPE) scholarship. I will analyze some of the main theoretical paradigms of IPE 
and their views on the role of institutions, with a focus on neo-liberalism, radicalism, and 
neo-realism. Lastly, I will apply a game-theoretical approach to modeling interaction 
between states, within a framework of institutionalism, focusing on the International 
Monetary Fund as the primary institution promoting monetary and financial cooperation.  
 
Defining Regimes and Institutions 
Before I start my discussion of the IMF, it is important to define and differentiate between 
the concepts of international regimes and international institutions. Krasner defined 
regimes “as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” (Krasner, 1983, 2). Aggarwal and DuPont (2008) separate Krasner’s definition 
of international regimes into two parts. The principles and norms, what he calls the “meta-
regime”, and “the regime itself, defined as the rules and procedure that allows us to 
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distinguish between two very different types of constraints on the behavior of states” 
(ibid.). For Agarwal and DuPont, the international institution synthesizes both the meta-
regime and the regime.  They make a clear distinction between international institutions 
and international organizations, advocating that there are “areas of international 
cooperation [with] well-defined principles, norms, rules, and procedures” outside the 
framework of an organization such as the IMF (Ibid.). International institutions play 
important roles in the international system. They are useful in the enforcement of 
agreements, in easing strained relations amongst states, and they make states less worry 
about engaging in cooperative behavior (Ibid.). As an international institution, the IMF 
promotes monetary cooperation amongst states and provides the necessary assistance when 
countries experience an economic crisis.  
 
Introduction to International Political Economy and Institutions 
International Political Economy (IPE) is a field of study that combines international 
relations and economics. Oatley (2012) defined IPE as the study “of how politics shape 
developments in the global economy and how the global economy shapes politics.” Tooze 
(1991), on the other hand, more vaguely defined IPE as an “area of investigation, a 
particular range of questions, and a series of assumptions about the nature of the 
international ‘system,’ and how we understand this ‘system.’” There is no one precise 
definition of IPE, but rather scholars tend to define it in vague terms due to the compound 
and open-ended scope of IPE. Frieden and Martin argue that even though there are 
discrepancies regarding the definition of IPE, “the field has approached consensus on 
theories, methods, analytical frameworks, and important questions” (Frieden and Martin, 
2001, 3) The main idea behind the field is that in the globalized world economy, it is not 
sufficient to study events and interaction between states solely from an international 
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relations or an international economics approach, but rather, both fields have to be 
considered to achieve an appropriate understanding of the international system. The field 
of IPE is relatively new, with its origins in the 1970s. Many scholars identify the 
abandoning of the gold standard, and with it, the Bretton Woods regime, as the starting 
point for IPE (Veseth, 2014). My thesis, therefore, is firmly couched in the IPE tradition 
of scholarship.  It is helpful, therefore, to examine the fundamentals of this field.   
There are three main ideologies within IPE: liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism 
(Gilpin, 1987, 25). These three schools of thought differ fundamentally “in their 
conceptions of the relationships among society, state, and [the] market” (ibid.). The 
controversies in the field of IPE can be to some extent reduced to the contrasting 
interpretations of these relationships (ibid.). 
Gilpin explains that liberalism has taken many forms such as “classical, neo-
classical, Keynesian, monetarist, Austrian, rational expectation” and its most contemporary 
expression is found in neoliberalism (Gilpin, 1987, 27). All the variations of liberalism 
have as a shared principle a commitment “to the market and the price mechanism as the 
most” efficient manner “for organizing domestic and international economic relations 
(ibid.).  Liberals believe that “human beings are by nature economic animals” and that “a 
market arises spontaneously in order to satisfy human needs” (ibid.).  A market economy, 
they argue, is the most efficient means of maximizing economic growth and in doing so, it 
increases the level of welfare in a society (ibid., 28). Liberalism views the “individual 
consumer, the firm, and the household [rather than the state] as the basis for society” 
(Gilpin, 1987, 25). Liberalists believe that a market economy is the most efficient system 
due to the laws of demand and supply. These laws state that as there is more demand for a 
scarce good the price will rise and as demand falls, so does the price. A consumer then gets 
to pay the price that equals the benefit received by the good, making a liberal capitalist 
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system the fairest and most efficient system. These laws make the market economy display 
a “powerful tendency toward equilibrium and inherent stability” (ibid, 29). For liberals, the 
government should play a very limited role in society and should not regulate the market 
since “economics is progressive and politics is retrogressive,” meaning that markets are 
self-regulating, and a political manipulation of the market leads to inefficiency (ibid., 30). 
Moreover, liberals argue that a market economy and free trade are the best ways to achieve 
a long-lasting peace amongst states since “the mutual benefits of trade and expanding 
interdependence among national economies will tend to foster cooperative relations” and 
the breaking of these relations by war becomes too costly (ibid, 31). Lastly, liberals argue 
that by following a market economy system, everybody is better off in “absolute terms” 
but the “relative terms” will be different (ibid.) What this means is that while everybody is 
better off than under any other economic system, there are some that are better off than 
others both in the domestic and the international sphere.  
Gilpin argues that the main idea behind nationalism “is that economic activities are 
and should be subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state” (Gilpin, 
1987, 31). The primary aspects of the “organization and functioning of the international 
system” are the “state, national security,” and military might (ibid.). Liberals tend to view 
the achievement of power and wealth as a tradeoff, whereas nationalists see the two goals 
as complementary, and believe that states “simultaneously pursue wealth and national 
power” (ibid.). For nationalists, industrialization should be the primary objective of a state. 
They argue that industrialization leads to an overall development of the economy, it results 
in “self-sufficiency and political autonomy,” and they view the industry as “the basis of 
military power, [which is] central to national security in the modern world” (ibid., 33). 
Nationalists also seek to protect the domestic economy from “external economic and 
political forces” and, therefore, argue for protectionism in the economy and 
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industrialization to achieve self-sufficiency (ibid.) Central to nationalism, is the idea that 
relative gains are more important than absolute mutual gains, and they argue that this 
explains why states are always in the process of changing the existing regimes in order to 
favor their interests (ibid.). They argue that cooperation in the international economic 
system is only possible if it is in the interests of the most powerful states to conserve the 
mechanisms of international cooperation (ibid., 34). They believe that relations between 
states are by nature conflictual and, therefore, cooperation between states is never equal, 
with smaller states free riding on the efforts of the most powerful states.  
Marxism has its origins in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, although 
it has been reinterpreted in many ways by the succeeding scholars of the ideology (Gilpin, 
1987, 34).  In the broadest sense, Marxism can be expressed in two ways: revolutionary 
Marxism, as in the case of the Russian Revolution, and social democratic Marxism, which 
Gilpin argues “is hardly distinguishable from the egalitarian form of liberalism” (ibid.). 
Even though Marxism has been interpreted in many ways, there four core principles that 
can be found in all Marxist scholarship. The first one is that reality is “dynamic and 
conflictual” and the social imbalances inherent to a capitalist system lead to a class struggle 
(ibid.). Marxists employ a “materialist approach to history” and view the development of 
the means of production as the source of a class struggle for the distribution of the wealth 
generated in the production process (ibid.). They view capitalism as being governed by the 
“economic laws of motion of modern society” (ibid.). The fourth idea of consensus is that 
a socialist society is not only desirable but also necessary (ibid.). Marxists believe that 
capitalism is irrational (ibid., 37). They argue that the principal driver of the capitalist 
system is the pursuit of profits, which can only be achieved by means of investment. When 
a capitalist has achieved levels of wealth that are large enough, his incentive to invest 
decreases. The decline in investment results in periods of economic stagnation and 
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recession, which will result in an uprising of the proletariat against the owners of capital. 
Therefore, the very nature of capitalism “sows the seeds of its own destruction” to give 
way to a socialist system (ibid.).  
For the present study, I will refer to the views of more contemporary interpretations 
of the IPE schools discussed above. From the liberal perspective, I will focus on neo-
liberalism, from the nationalist school I will concentrate on neo-realism, and from the 
Marxist viewpoint, I will discuss the radicalist appraisal of international institutions. I 
believe that these contemporary interpretations are the most pertinent in making an analysis 
of the IMF given the time frame that the Fund has existed. 
The different schools of thought of IPE have opposing appraisals of international 
regimes, international institutions, and their roles and use in the international system. Neo-
realists such as Waltz (1979) believe that in a system of anarchy, countries only look after 
their best interest. Therefore, international institutions do not have any real power or 
autonomy to act, given the power structure of the anarchical international system. For neo-
realists, “collaboration will only be sustainable if states value future interactions highly, 
have symmetric resources, and are highly dependent” (Agarwal and DuPont, 2008). 
Keohane argues that “the ease with which international regimes can be shown to have only 
weak centralized enforcement powers is taken by realists as demonstrating the irrelevance 
of these institutions” (Keohane, 1984, 238). He goes on to say that “the dichotomy between 
‘anarchy’ and ‘hierarchy’ … is itself fundamentally misleading” and that neo-realists 
overlook the role that these institutions have as “facilitators of agreement among 
governments” (ibid.). Neo-liberal institutionalists believe that international regimes 
establish patterns of legal liability, provide relatively symmetrical information, and arrange 
the costs of bargaining so that agreements can be more easily reached (Keohane, 1984, 88). 
Neo-liberals believe that international regimes help to lower “transaction costs” by 
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reducing the costs of meeting to negotiate agreements, and decreasing the “marginal costs 
of dealing with each additional issue” once a regime has been established (ibid., 90). 
 Lastly, radicalism, inspired by Marxism, attempts to demonstrate that due to the 
nature of the capital system, the dispossessed end up suffering and argues for a change in 
the current economic system (Watson, 2008). Radicalists would argue that international 
institutions favor the wealthy, developed nations at the expense of the low-income, 
developing countries. Bargaining power is essentially weighted towards rich nations, no 
matter how small the transactions costs of meeting might be made by international 
institutions. Therefore, radicalists would argue for a complete overhaul of the existing 
international institutions in order to provide an equal playing field for all the states in the 
international system.  
 
Origins of the IMF: Bretton Woods – A Story of International Relations and American 
Hegemony 
Today we live in a world of economic interconnectedness, where economic policy 
adopted in one part of the world, can have often important consequences in countries 
thousands of miles away. This was not always the case. The world began to experience 
economic cooperation and interrelation during the time of the Pax Britannica (Peet, 2009, 
37). The United Kingdom had emerged from the industrial revolution as an economic 
powerhouse, with an empire that extended all over the world. This imperial system and 
Britain’s preeminent role in the international system, made countries dependent on Britain, 
both in terms of imports and exports.  
The First World War brought allied economies together. However, the devastating 
effects of the war took away Britain’s position, and the United States emerged as the most 
economically powerful country in the world. Following the war, however, the United States 
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adopted a policy of isolationism since its citizens were tired of the war, and politicians 
believed the United States ought not to interfere as much in European affairs. This 
isolationism is best demonstrated in the failure of the United States to join the League of 
Nations, a concept originally proposed by the American president Woodrow Wilson.  
In Europe, there were intentions as early as 1920 to create an “international bank to 
aid post-war reconstruction” (Pete, 2009, 40). The next attempt at crafting such an entity 
took place in The Hague in 1930, with plans to establish a Bank for International 
Settlements. The bank was not created because the system lacked a hegemonic figure to 
take the leading role in the institution. Britain was unable due to the shattering economic 
effects of the war, and the United States, although capable, was not willing to assume that 
role (ibid). The financial meltdown of the Great Depression came to an end with the 
outbreak of World War II. The United States understood that, in part, the War was a result 
of America’s reluctance to get involved in the financing of European countries, which in 
turn demanded high reparations from Germany (ibid, 46). During the time of World War 
II, the United States accepted its role as the leader of the international system, as did the 
developed states of Europe (Scammell, 1980).  
During the War, both Britain and the United States recognized the need for 
international institutions aimed at the reconstruction of devastated economies, as well as 
for the promotion of international monetary cooperation and trade. Advocates of free trade 
argue that international commerce makes war obsolete (Mill, 1848). This is the case since 
as international trade takes place, economies become dependent on one another. Therefore, 
countries have an incentive to maintain peace in order to foster healthy economic growth 
through exports, and the optimal allocation of resources.  
The Bretton Woods Conference took place in June 1944 and was attended by 
representatives of 44 allied nations. According to the IMF, the central point of the Bretton 
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Woods Conference was “to build a framework for economic cooperation that would avoid 
a repetition of the vicious circle of competitive devaluations that had contributed to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s” (IMF). Pete (2009) argues that it was not so much a 
collective building of a framework, as much as it was Britain and the United States 
presenting the project they had been discussing for two and a half years prior to the 
conference, and the attending countries signed the agreement without any opportunity to 
object. The main aim for the United States, Pete (2009) argues, was to displace Britain as 
the financial center of the world. The principal architects of the Bretton Woods financial 
system where Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury under the Roosevelt 
administration; Harry D. White, a senior U.S. Treasury Department official; and Britain’s 
Finance Minister, John Maynard Keynes. In 1942, Harry White created two plans, one for 
the establishment of a “United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development of the United and Associated Nations” (Van Dormael, 1978). These two 
documents would become the blue-prints for the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the latter, now part 
of the World Bank Group). In the discussions leading to Bretton Woods, there were 
significant differences of opinion between the British and the Americans. The American 
interests prevailed, however. An example of these discrepancies is that the United States 
“wanted a large political organization (the IMF) … while Keynes wanted a small, part-
time organization” (Pete, 2009, 52). The institution created was not democratic, but rather, 
each state’s voting power depended on their individual contribution quota (amount of funds 
they would contribute to the IMF), which was calculated to reflect the country’s size and 
economic importance (Cohen, 1977). The resulting quota system made the United States 
the most powerful country in the IMF, followed by Britain, then the USSR, and China 
(Mikesell, 1994, 22). The quota system resulted in an initial system where the United States 
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had 27.9% of the voting power, and the United Kingdom 13.3% (Scammell, 1980). These 
vote percentages have changed, and now the United States enjoys 16.67% of voting power 
and the United Kingdom 4.07% (IMF).  
The United States also sought to expand its preeminence in the world economy by 
making the U.S. dollar the reserve currency of the world. One of the most important points 
of agreement among the members of the Bretton Woods Conference was that the floating 
exchange rates that characterized the 1930s were detrimental for trade and investment. 
Therefore, the United States advocated for a Classical gold standard, with the United States 
holding three-quarters of global central bank gold reserves after the War (Cohen, 1977). 
The Theory of Adjustment Process Under the International Gold Standard was outlined by 
Classical thinker David Hume as a ‘price – specie flow mechanism’ that was self-regulating 
(Helleiner, 2008). According to Hume, when a country experienced a balance of payments 
crisis, the exports of gold would reduce national wages, making the country more 
competitive (ibid.). The Bretton Woods system resulted in a classical-inspired gold 
standard system with a significant role for the U.S. dollar and a pegged exchange rate 
system also known as a par value system. The new regime differed from the old gold 
standard in that the peg currency system was adjustable in the case of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium’ (ibid.).  Countries would assign a gold value to their national currency and 
gold was continuously valued at $35 per ounce (Peet, 2009, 76). The United States emerged 
in the Bretton Woods System as a veritable monetary hegemon. Cohen (1977) argues that 
the United States welcomed the role of monetary hegemon “for reasons that were a mixture 
of altruism and self-interest.” By assuming this role, in a new geopolitical environment of 
the Cold War, America was able to show the economic might and prosperity that comes 
from free-market capitalism, while in financing the reconstruction of Europe, the new 
hegemon prevented the spread of communism.  
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The breakdown of the Bretton Woods gold standard system was predicted by the 
International Political Economist Robert Triffin, in what is known in IPE as the Triffin 
Dilemma (Helleiner, 2008). Triffin believed that the gold exchange standard was unstable 
because the dollar was the central reserve currency, which linked all other economies to 
gold. (Triffin, 1961). Thus, the system created a situation in which the only way for the 
international economic system to get liquidity was from the United States running balance 
of payments deficits, which in turn would undermine the “confidence in the dollar’s 
convertibility to gold” (Helleiner, 2008). The system came to an abrupt end when the 
United States announced it would no longer convert U.S. dollars into gold (Cohen, 1977). 
A way to solve the problem was creating an international currency, an idea proposed by 
Keynes in the discussions prior to the Bretton Woods Conference (Helleiner, 2008). In 
1969, Special Drawing Rights (SDR) were created, a new international currency that would 
replace the dollar as the new reserve currency (ibid.). According to the IMF, the current 
value of SDR is “based on a basket of four major currencies: the U.S. dollar, the euro, the 
Japanese yen, and the pound sterling.” The Chinese renminbi will join the amalgam of 
currencies in October 2016 (IMF).  
The unprecedented Bretton Woods Agreement would have been unthinkable less 
than ten years before it took place because there were not the necessary conditions needed 
for such a centralized management of the world economy. According to Hart and Spero 
(1989), three aspects were true in 1944 and had not been there before, which made the 
Bretton Woods Conference successful. They argue that the political circumstances that 
made the Bretton Woods System successful were “the concentration of power in a small 
number of states, the existence of a cluster of important interests shared by those states, 
and the presence of a dominant power willing and able to assume a leadership role” (ibid, 
1).  
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In IPE scholarship, the neorealist Hegemonic Stability Theory advocates that the 
“international financial and monetary regime” remains stable as long as there is a 
hegemonic leadership (Helleiner, 2008). What this means is that the international system 
remains stable as long as it is in the interest of the hegemonic actor. Cooperation in the 
international system is very costly. In the case of the IMF, the Hegemonic Stability Theory 
is best exemplified in the role that the United States plays, being the largest contributor to 
the institution. The United States assumes this cost because it judges that the costs of 
playing the hegemonic role in the system are smaller than the benefits it gets from being 
the major contributor, such as being the only state with a veto power in the institution.   
Keohane contests this idea and argues that “although hegemony can facilitate cooperation, 
it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it” (Keohane, 1984, 12). Britain 
played the role of hegemonic leader before World War I, however, it was displaced by a 
United States that was reluctant to assume the hegemonic role in the inter-war period, 
leading according to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, to the economic instability that 
characterized the period.   
Most of the states that took part in the Bretton Woods Conference had little to no 
influence over what was agreed, and their presence and signing were more than anything a 
formality. The terms of the agreement, as discussed above, were sketched out mainly by 
American and British interests and then imposed on the other allied countries. The United 
States and Britain both wanted the creation of an institution that would facilitate financial 
cooperation although they disagreed in how it would look. At the same time, the British 
needed financing from the United States, and the United States saw this as an opportunity 
to take the title of financial capital for the world from London. Lastly, one could imagine 
the system having happened before, if only the United States would have wanted to 
abandon its isolationist policy and pursue a leadership role in the multilateral world 
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economy. During the War, and in the following years, it became apparent that it was not 
only an option but necessary for the United States to assume such a leadership role and 
emerge from the bellicose period as a hegemon, in a system of war-battered developed 
states, and impoverished developing countries (Nye, 2015, 2). 
 
Purpose of the International Monetary Fund 
The guidelines for the operations at the IMF were outlined in the “Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund”, which were agreed upon at Bretton 
Woods in 1944 and entered into force December 27, 1945 (IMF). Article 1 of this 
document outlines the purposes for which the IMF was created. The six purposes 
described in Article 1 are the following (IMF):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and 
collaboration on international monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high 
levels of employment and real income and to the development of the 
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic 
policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in 
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination 
of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of 
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus 
providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national 
or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the 
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of 
members. 
 15 
 
In addition to the six original goals outlined above, the IMF also promotes 
sustainable economic growth, the reduction of poverty around the world, and its mandate 
was updated in “2012 to include all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear 
on global stability” (IMF). The very vague language of the update significantly increased 
the scope of the IMF’s operations and the areas where the organization can interfere in its 
member countries. Increasing the areas of action for the IMF is not necessarily a good thing 
since it makes it more difficult for the international community to judge the level of success 
of the institution once all macroeconomic indicators are included in its mandate.  Even 
though the main argument in my thesis is that the IMF promotes economic growth, this 
was not the primary purpose for which the organization was originally envisioned.  
The concept of economic growth is outlined in Article IV, Section 1 of the Articles 
of Agreement. It reads “the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to 
provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital among 
countries, and that sustains sound economic growth” and requires members to “endeavor 
to direct [their] economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly 
economic growth with reasonable price stability” (IMF, 2016). In this sense, the IMF sees 
itself as providing a framework for economies to thrive, but places the responsibility of 
achieving such growth on individual states, through the adoption of an appropriate 
economic policy.  
The most important aspect for the founders of the organization was international 
monetary cooperation in order to stabilize exchange rates and to provide liquidity by way 
of loans to countries that are having problems with their balance of payments. The balance 
of payments is defined as “all transactions between a country’s residents and its 
nonresidents involving goods, services and income; financial claims and liabilities to the 
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rest of the world; and transfers such as gifts” (Heakal, 2003). Countries need to keep 
reserves of gold or hard currency such as the U.S. dollar to continue to pay for imports in 
the event of a shock to the economy such as a sudden fall in the country’s exports (Peet, 
2009, 75). States are required to keep enough reserves as to permit them to keep on paying 
for imports for several months in such a situation, however, when reserves are depleted, or 
only account for a few weeks’ worth of imports the country is said to experience a balance 
of payments crisis (ibid.).  
The IMF believes that these crises occur as a result of bad luck, inappropriate 
economic policy, or a combination of the two (IMF). Some other causes of balance of 
payments crises include “weak domestic financial systems; large and persistent fiscal 
deficits; high levels of external and/or public debt; exchange rates fixed at inappropriate 
levels; natural disasters; or armed conflicts or a sudden and strong increase in the price of 
key commodities such as food and fuel” (ibid.). In such a case, the IMF recommends 
countries devalue their currency, to make their exports more competitive, and to attract 
foreign currency to pay for exports (ibid.). This policy, however, also makes imports more 
expensive for the country in crisis, which can result in a negative disruption of the country’s 
economy. When a country faces a balance of payments crisis or a sudden economic 
depression, the country can “immediately and unconditionally” make use of 25% of their 
IMF quota (Peet, 2009, 72). This percentage is called a tranche or portion of the quota 
which was originally deposited by the member country in the way of gold of hard currency. 
If the country needed extra funds, it could make use three times their original quota, 
however, the IMF views this as a crisis caused by bad economic policy (Vreeland, 2003, 
10). Therefore, the so-called upper tranche loans (more than 25%), have conditions 
attached to them to fix the structural problems that led to the crisis in the first place (Peet, 
2009, 72).  
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Types of Loans and Conditionality 
The quantity and types of loans offered by the IMF have varied significantly in the 
70 years that the institution has existed. Periods of high intensity of credit issuing took 
place in the 1970s with the rises in the prices of oil that resulted in a balance of payment 
crises in many developing nations (IMF). Other periods characterized by a high volume of 
loans, were the debt crisis of the 1980s and the transition from socialism to market 
economies in the countries of the Soviet Bloc. More recently, in the early 2000s the IMF 
issued a significant number of loans in Latin America, and the Institution saw an increase 
in loans due to the financial crisis of 2008 (ibid.).  
The IMF offers both concessional and non-concessional loans, concessional being 
loans offered at interest rates below market rates. The Fund provides concessional lending 
to low-income countries through funds from the recently created Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust (PGRT), which includes the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Standby 
Credit Facility (SCF), and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). The ECF provides countries 
with sustained engagement in case of a prolonged balance of payments crisis. The SCF 
provides short-term loans, and the RCF provides immediate credit without conditionality.  
The IMF also offers non-concessional loans, the most common of which are, 
according to Barro and Lee (2004), the Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF). They are designed to provide short-term and mid-term balance of 
payments assistance to member countries. The SBA has been the most widely used facility. 
It provides credit for one to two years and requires the loan-recipient country to pay back 
three to five years after disbursement (IMF). The EFF is similar to the SBA, but it is 
focused on medium to long-term balance of payment crises, with countries having to repay 
four and a half to 10 years after disbursement (ibid.).  The Rapid Financing Instrument 
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makes funds available to countries that experienced a natural disaster or are recovering 
from war (ibid.). 
The most controversial aspect of IMF loans is, without a doubt, the conditionality 
attached to the loans. The aspect of conditionality was outlined in Article V of the Articles 
of Agreement, under Section 3 and reads “[t]he Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its 
general resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt 
special policies for special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve 
their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general 
resources of the Fund” (IMF). The very vague language in Article V could be interpreted 
in many different ways, and it has been during the Fund’s history.  
The leading advocate for conditionality in Bretton Woods was the American 
delegation. Keynes wanted countries to reserve the right to adopt their own domestic 
policy. Peet (2009, 59) advocates that the American delegation “insisted that use of Fund 
resources should be subject to close scrutiny to assure a country’s adherence to its 
principles and purposes.” Britain and France abstained from the vote on conditionality, 
while the other nations agreed to please the United States, but also because many delegates 
did not even speak English and had no idea what they were signing (ibid., 49). 
Conditionality has taken many forms, and it depended on who was asking for a 
loan. During the first 20 years of its history, half of the drawings from the Fund were taken 
by developed nations with lenient conditionality (ibid.). A good example of this leniency 
towards the developed nations was Britain. The country had made the most use of IMF 
credit, taking $7.25 billion between 1947 and 1971 (Peet, 2009, 80). The only conditions 
attached to the loans where letters of intent, and agreeing to consult the Fund for any major 
policy shifts (ibid.). These modus operandi changed when Britain suffered a currency crisis 
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in 1976 and had to apply for a loan from the IMF, only this time the Fund would not be so 
lenient. The IMF required Britain to make cuts in public spending such as social programs, 
implemented fiscal and monetary targets, and instructed Britain to get rid of import controls 
(ibid., 81). Following such austerity measures imposed to a founding member of the 
organization, developed nations refrained from making use of the Fund (IMF).  
In the 1980s the Fund shifted its attention to the developing world, and 
conditionality took on a neo-liberal form, with a fundamentalist belief in the markets, 
privatization, and free trade. This neo-liberal ideology was imposed on emerging countries 
through conditionality aimed at correcting what the IMF thought incorrect policies that 
lead to economic crisis (Gilpin, 2001, 306) The conditions given to developing countries 
were summarized by John Williamson under the term “Washington Consensus.” The term 
refers to a set of policy prescriptions for economic development in Latin America (although 
can be extended to most developing countries that made use of IMF credit), which were 
shared by Washington-based institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the U.S. 
Congress, the economic agencies of the U.S. government, as well as the Federal Reserve 
Board and other Washington-based think tanks. Williamson (1990) coined the term in his 
paper entitled “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” The paper included ten policy 
recommendations for which Williamson believed there was convergence amongst the 
Washington institutions.  
His list included the following ten policies: 
1. Fiscal Discipline 
2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities 
3. Tax Reform 
4. Liberalizing Interest Rates 
5. Competitive Exchange Rates 
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6. Trade Liberalization 
7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
8. Privatization 
9. Deregulation 
10. Property Rights 
The term “Washington Consensus” became widespread, as a way for activists and 
those opposed to the Fund to point to the causes of the economic downturn in many 
developing, loan-recipient countries such as Mexico in 1982, Argentina in 2001 and Brazil 
in 2002 as well as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Peet, 2009, 86-96).  
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Game – Theoretic Models of Cooperation Applied to the IMF 
Cooperation between states in the international system, within a framework of 
international institutionalism, is essential for the optimal functioning of the international 
system in terms of trade, optimal allocation of resources, and economic development. 
Game theory allows us to model cooperation between states and other actors in the 
international system such as the IMF. In this section, I explore two Game Theory models. 
The first one is aimed at showing the benefits of having an institution such as the IMF in 
the international system, and the second one explores why a country might accept IMF 
conditionality. 
Several problems that stem from a world of interconnected economies that can 
hinder economic cooperation between countries, and that are made better by the existence 
of international regimes and institutions. One of these problems is called the “inhibiting 
fear” (Ravenhill, 2008). The IMF incentivizes countries to liberalize their economies in 
terms of trade and flows of capital. Countries are reluctant to do so, however, due to the 
volatility of the international economic system. Countries fear “sharp fluctuations of short-
term capital” (Calvo & Talvi, 2005). This refers to the idea that if capital flows are 
liberalized, a country can receive a large amount of investment by way of FDI, and when 
economic conditions in the international system become dire, foreign investors take back 
their invested capital, sinking the country further into crisis. Most scholars now agree that 
this volatile flow of capital was one of the main reasons for the Asian Financial crisis that 
struck countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1997 (Stiglitz, 2007). The 
concept of inhibiting fear can be modeled using an “assurance game” of “Stag Hunt”. The 
game models the “uncertainty of benefits and costs linked to integration in the world 
economy” (Aggarwal & DuPont, 2007). The game’s payoffs are shown in ordinal form, 
meaning that the highest number represents the highest payoff. 
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The game of Stag Hunt is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Inhibiting Fear: Stag Hunt 
	 Player B 
 
Player A 
 S 1  
(Stag) 
S 1 
(Rabbit) 
S 1  
(Stag) 
4 , 4 1 , 3 
S 2 
(Rabbit) 
3 , 1 2 , 2 
 
 
The idea behind the Stag Hunt game, is that two players go hunting in different parts of a 
forest for a stag that is hiding. They both have an agreement that they will only shoot the 
stag, and no other animal so that the noise from the shot of another animal will not make 
the stag remain in hiding. In Figure 1, strategy S1 refers to following the initial agreement 
and only shooting the stag, whereas strategy S2 refers to shooting another animal such as 
a rabbit so that the hunter does not go home empty handed. The numbers in bold type 
represent Nash Equilibria and the first number in each of the payoffs represents the payoff 
for Player A. As the day comes to an end, if both hunters think that their counterpart will 
not honor their agreement of only shooting at the stag, they will both shoot the rabbit to 
achieve the “highest minimal gain for the individual” represented in the lower right-hand 
square (Aggarwal & DuPont, 2008). The “players share a single most preferred outcome” 
but “do not have dominant strategies” and their actions will depend on whether they believe 
their counterpart will stick to the agreement (ibid.). They are likely not to shoot the rabbit 
(S2) since the preferred outcome would be the upper left-hand corner. The outcome 
represents a Pareto-deficient equilibrium.  
The purpose of this game is not to achieve additional gains, so the choosing of the 
S2 strategy depends on whether the player anticipates the other will make a mistake and 
fire his gun. This game is reflected in the international system because states fear that other 
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states will make mistakes in their policies that will lead to economic crises and that the 
interconnectedness of the markets is going to result in them receiving the negative impact 
of the other country’s mistake by way of contagion. Institutions such as the IMF help to 
reduce this inhibiting fear since it provides a framework for countries’ policies as well as 
it monitors countries and shares information about economic performance. These roles of 
the IMF reduce the inhibiting fear in countries because they have information about what 
actions other states are going to take. Moreover, countries’ are reassured that they can 
safely engage in trade because if a Country A’s trading partner (Country B) has a sudden 
balance of payments crisis and cannot pay for its imports, country B can apply for a loan 
with the IMF to pay its debts, reassuring Country A that is will receive payment for its 
imports, thus facilitating trade and extending the shadow of the future.  
Aggarwal and DuPont (2008) also depict a game that helps to explain the 
interactions between powerful and weak actors of the international system. The game is 
named “Called Bluff” and it is depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: “Called Bluff” 
 Player B 
(Weak Actor) 
 
Player A 
(Powerful Actor) 
 S 1  
(Accept) 
S 2 
(Not Accept) 
S 1  
(Accept) 
3 , 3 1 ,4 
S 2 
(Not Accept) 
4 , 2 2 , 1 
 
This is a game with asymmetrical payoffs. Player A has as a dominant strategy to 
play S2, whereas Player B would play S2 if Player A plays S1 and Player B would play S1 
if Player A plays S2. Player B knows that Player A has a dominant strategy in playing S2, 
so in order to maximize her gains, Player B will choose S1, resulting in the Nash 
 24 
Equilibrium depicted in the lower left-hand square. This way player B does not get her 
preferred outcome but gets her “second worse outcome” (ibid.).  
This game is used to model the interaction between a powerful actor (Player A) and 
a weak actor (Player B), where the weak actor has the greatest need for cooperation. The 
example Aggarwal and DuPont (2008) use to illustrate this sort of cooperation is when the 
United States (Player A) asked Germany and Japan (Player B) to devalue their currency so 
as to relieve pressure on the dollar. When Germany and Japan refused, the United States 
being the stronger actor, responded by announcing it would no longer convert the dollar 
into gold. In doing so, the United States forced the costs of cooperation to the weaker 
countries, Germany and Japan.  
I apply this game to explain why countries accept the harsh conditions that many 
times come with the loans of the IMF. Let strategy S1 represent accepting the other actor’s 
conditions, which would mean for the IMF (Player A) to accept the weak country’s (Player 
B’s) need for a loan with low conditionality. For the weak country, strategy S1 would mean 
to accept the IMF’s conditions for a loan. Strategy S2 for the IMF would be not to accept 
the weak country’s conditions and imposing conditionality on the loan. For the weak 
country, Strategy S2 would mean not to accept the IMF’s conditionality. The weak 
country’s preferred outcome would be the one depicted in the upper right-hand corner, 
where the country receives a loan with low conditionality. However, since the weak 
country knows that the IMF has the dominant strategy in not accepting the country’s 
conditions (Strategy S2), the weak country has no bargaining power, therefore, it is going 
to choose strategy S1 and accept the IMF’s conditions. If it does not, the outcome would 
be the one depicted in the lower right-hand corner, where the weak country gets the lowest 
payoff.  
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Conclusion 
In a world with a globalized interconnected economy, it is of great importance to 
have international institutions that help to foster cooperation between actors in the 
international system. In this chapter, I have analyzed the International Monetary Fund from 
an International Political Economy standpoint and advocated that the existence of the IMF 
is in the best interest of the international community in order to promote international 
monetary cooperation so as to prevent or control economic crisis and promote a sustainable 
economic growth in the world.  
The IMF is by no means a perfect institution. However, it is better to have an 
imperfect institution that promotes cooperation than not to have such an institution at all. 
There are many areas in which the IMF can be criticized, and a substantial amount of the 
criticism of the institution is well founded. For neo-realists, the IMF is pointless, and 
inefficient since states in a world of anarchy are only concerned with their own interest. 
This is to some degree true. Every country is seeking to maximize its payoffs, but in order 
to do so, cooperation is of the utmost necessity. In designing the IMF, the most powerful 
members of the international system at the time were looking after their own interests, but 
understood that in order to prevent further wars and create a world of international trade, 
open markets, and the optimal allocation of resources, there was a need for international 
cooperation. For radicalists, the IMF has hurt the most disenfranchised members of the 
international system for the gain of the richest states. It is true that many countries have 
had negative experiences in dealing with the IMF. What the radicalist review fails to 
address is the fact that even though countries are assigned harsh conditions with their loans, 
it is unclear what would happen if an impoverished country did not have an institution to 
turn to in a crisis situation. Private banks would not lend money to a state that is failing 
while the IMF would, and it is more than understandable that the institution will seek to 
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implement some economic policy reforms in the country to prevent them from ending up 
in the same debacle. The degree of success of the IMF’s policies and its adherence to neo-
liberal economics is subject of debate. In the next part of this study, I attempt to provide an 
understanding of the degree of success of the IMF in promoting sustainable economic 
growth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), gross capital formation, and 
employment.  
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II. Economic Analysis of the IMF 
Introduction to Neoliberalism as an Economic Theory 
Neoliberalism is an economic theory that argues that the most efficient way to 
stimulate economic growth is through free market competition. Peet (2009, 9) describes 
neoliberalism as “an entire structure of beliefs founded on right-wing, but not conservative, 
ideas about individual freedom, political democracy, self-regulating markets and 
entrepreneurship.” It represents a renewal of ideas established by classical economists such 
as Adam Smith, David Riccardo, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume (ibid., 4).  
Neoliberalism advocates that the economic growth brought about by the practice of laissez-
faire economics benefits everyone in society. The idea is that through free markets, the 
optimal allocation of resources, “minimal state intervention in economic and social affairs, 
and [a] commitment to the freedom of trade and capital,” wealth is generated in a country, 
which translates into job creation and higher salaries for people (Smith).   
Peet (2009, 9) argues that classical liberalism was reconfigured into a more current 
version of neoliberalism starting in the earlier parts of the 20th century at universities such 
as the Austrian School of Economics, the London School of Economics, and the Hoover 
Institution of Stanford University. However, Peet (ibid.) argues that the Chicago School of 
Political economy was the most influential in crafting this ideology, by a new wave of 
scholars such as Milton Friedman, George Stigler, James Buchanan, Gary Becker, Robert 
Lucas, and Friedrich von Hayek, who believed in “self-interested, competitive behavior in 
economy, polity and just about everything else.”  
Neoliberalism was a reaction to Keynesian economics which had been the 
prevailing school of through after the Great Depression of the 1930s. Keynesianism argues 
that “there is no automatic tendency for economies to reach an equilibrium position that 
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sustains full employment, and that governments, through the manipulation of fiscal 
policies, can affect aggregate demand and reduce unemployment” (Ravenhill, 2008, 482). 
In Keynes’ model of Aggregate Demand, the main factors that influence output include 
consumption, investment, government spending and net exports. Therefore, if 
consumption, investment, and net exports remain unchanged, the government can increase 
output by increasing government spending. Neoliberals, on the other hand, believe that 
government intervention causes inflation in an economic system that is “naturally self-
equilibrating” (Pete, 2009, 12). The early 1970s were a period of crisis for Keynesians due 
to the phenomenon of stagflation. Stagflation is the name given to an economy that 
experiences both high unemployment and high inflation (Helleiner, 2008, 228). According 
to Keynesians stagflation should not occur since “prices were supposed to be constrained 
from rising by the decreased in demand” caused by high unemployment (Hendricks, 2011). 
Stagflation caused governments to move from Keynesianism to neoliberalism.  Pete (2009, 
11) argues that the ideas of neoliberalism “moved rapidly from right-wing quackery” to 
achieve a significant level of legitimacy when Friedrich von Hayek won the Nobel Prize 
for economics in 1974, and since then it became the norm in most developed countries.  
Both the governments of the United States and Britain under the rule of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher embraced the neoliberal ideals. Given that these two 
countries, and in particular the U.S. Treasury Department, have had the most influence on 
the IMF, the institution shifted from a Keynesian approach, to adopt neoliberal policies 
(ibid., 14). Since then, the IMF has consistently imposed neoliberal structural adjustment 
programs in developing countries, with a firm belief that free market economies would 
result in economic growth for participant countries. 
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Literature Review 
 
From the outset, politicians, scholars, and activists have criticized the IMF for the 
conditionality applied to their loan programs. IMF conditionality uses a “quantitative 
performance criteria for macroeconomic policies, which include key variables related to 
ceilings for the fiscal deficit and the central bank's net domestic credit, [as well as] floors 
for net international reserves” (Mussa and Savastano, 1999). Bird (1995) argues that the 
Fund “has a powerful say on the exchange rate, domestic credit creation, [and] interest 
rates.” Many have characterized this conditions as taking away sovereignty from the loan-
recipient countries, which has made them reluctant to engage in IMF programs.  
Scholars, like Barro and Lee (2004), argue that austerity measures hinder the GDP 
growth in countries that are already experiencing economic problems. Macroeconomic 
theory suggests that this would be the case given that government spending is an important 
component of GDP. However, this is not necessarily the case for all countries. Every 
country that receives an IMF loan enters the program under significantly different 
circumstances. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are some instances in which IMF 
aid is successful and some in which IMF involvement can have detrimental effects on the 
economic growth of a country. Bird (1996) argues that developing countries use the IMF 
as a “lender of last resort” and that once they apply for loans the economic conditions in 
the countries are “usually critical with severe [balance of payments] difficulties, depleted 
international reserves, and high levels of external debt. Low investment and slow economic 
growth.” Therefore, one can assume that countries do not experience higher growth while 
in the program, given the amount of economic problems that first have to be addressed in 
the countries in order to later have sustainable growth patterns.  
Most of the literature on the effectiveness of IMF programs is divided, with some 
scholars arguing that IMF loans decrease growth, others arguing that the programs increase 
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growth, and some finding there is no significant effect. Moreover, scholars like Conway 
(1994) have found that participation has “as [a] contemporaneous effect” the reduction of 
growth, but once lags on participation are taken into account, IMF program enrollment has 
a positive effect on growth. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) found similar results, which 
showed that “[p]rogram participation lowers growth rates for as long as countries remain 
under a program. Once countries leave the program, they grow faster than if they had 
remained, but not faster than they would have without participation.” 
Vreeland (2003, 125), on the other hand, concluded that “when matched for 
exogenous conditions, participation in IMF programs reduces growth, and has no salutary 
effect once the country leaves.” He also found that the “rate of growth of capital stocks is 
lower when countries are under an agreement” (Ibid., 127).   
Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) found that when accounting for the policies that the 
participating country would have pursued in the absence of IMF conditionality, 
participation has a positive effect on growth. Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) found that when 
a country is enrolled in a program with both the IMF and World Bank simultaneously, the 
combination of both institutions results in a positive effect on economic growth. Bird 
(1995) argues that “[a]t an early stage of economic development, low-income countries are 
heavily dependent on the Fund”, but once they achieve higher levels of income they refrain 
from making use of the IMF’s credit. This dependency is important since there is a need 
for an institution to provide those funds, which would not be an option for low-income 
countries in the absence of the Fund. 
One of the most comprehensive studies on the topic was carried out by Dreher in 
2006. He first looked at 32 of the most influential papers on the effects of IMF programs 
on growth and found that seven concluded IMF aid increases growth, 17 found that there 
is no significant effect, and eight concluded IMF aid has a negative effect on growth. 
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Dreher’s account of the existing literature sheds light on the discrepancies that exist in 
academia when it comes to determining the success of IMF aid. The study further illustrates 
the elusiveness of the question at hand since so many years of scholarly research on the 
effects of participation on growth have been unable to create a consensus. 
A limitation that arises from attempting to estimate the effects of IMF participation 
on real GDP growth and growth-related indicators such as gross capital formation and 
unemployment is that IMF Participation “is not exogenous but usually the consequence of 
a crisis” (Dreher, 2006). Dreher (2006) explains that most of the older studies done on the 
topic ignored the problem of endogeneity, but more recent ones have taken it into 
consideration. Vreeland (2003, 107) agrees with Dreher (2006) and argues that it is not 
simple to estimate the effects of IMF participation on growth due to “the standard difficulty 
in evaluating the effects of any policy or program in non-random selection.”  
In his own empirical analysis, Dreher (2006) used a 3SLS model to account for 
endogeneity and concluded that IMF loans have a negative effect on growth, but also found 
that “there is some evidence that compliance with IMF conditionality does increase growth 
rates once sample selection is taken into account.” Dreher’s model, however, includes a 
large amount of variables that do not necessarily agree with each other. It also includes 
only developing countries and generalizes his results in order to claim that participation 
reduces growth without addressing the effects on developed countries.  
In my study of how IMF participation affects economic growth, I will account for 
endogeneity. The discrepancies in the conclusions reached by the various studies are due 
to several reasons including researchers looking at different time periods, researchers 
looking at specific groups of countries, the year when the study was carried out, and the 
methodology used. Most of the literature on the subject looks at restricted time periods in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Since my time series cover a longer period of time, I have the benefit 
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of more data to evaluate whether the IMF has been more successful particularly in the latter 
part of its history. 
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III. Quantitative Results 
Data Analysis 
I collected data from the World Bank’s Data Bank to construct the panel dataset 
used in my study of how IMF aid affects economic growth, and with it, the formation of 
capital and unemployment in a country that participates in an IMF program. The World 
Bank’s Data Bank collects yearly data from most countries on macroeconomic indicators. 
The data used in the study was last updated the 12th November 2015. The World Bank 
collects data reported by governments. However, not all governments report values every 
year. Therefore, I restricted my sample to countries that reported data for all of the 
indicators of interest.  I used a sample of 177 countries, some of which had received IMF 
loans in the period 1980 – 2014. I collected data for 25 variables and constructed a strongly 
balanced panel dataset with 6335 observations.  
The panel dataset I constructed includes data for several macroeconomic indicators 
including: inflation, unemployment, foreign direct investment, gross capital formation 
growth, labor force growth, interest rates, and the use of IMF credit, as well as other 
macroeconomic indicators that I did not include in my regression models as the focus of 
my analysis and identification strategy varied throughout my research process. The 
variables in the dataset were selected out of intuition and a study of factors that affect GDP 
growth. 
Table 1 in Appendix A contains descriptive statistics for the variables included in 
the regression model. The dependent variable in the model is real GDP growth. The 
explanatory variable of interest in the regression model is IMF participation. IMF 
participation is a binary variable that takes a value of one if a country made use of IMF 
credit in a particular year. The mean value of the IMF participation variable is 0.55, which 
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tells us that 55% of the observations account for countries that made use of IMF credit in 
a given year. 
The variable gross capital formation growth represents the indicator that replaced 
gross domestic investment in the World Bank’s indicators. It “consists of outlays on 
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories” 
(World Bank). It is calculated by the World Bank using the World Bank and OECD 
National Accounts Data, and it is reported as an annual percentage growth rate. This 
variable was included in the model since investment is a major component of GDP 
associated with a positive effect on growth. I first use gross capital formation growth as an 
independent variable to see what effect it has on economic growth. I then use it as a 
dependent variable in a difference-in-differences regression to investigate the effect of IMF 
loans on gross capital formation.  
The Unemployment variable refers to the percentage of the total labor force that is 
actively looking for a job but cannot find one, and it is reported by the International Labor 
Organization using World Bank estimates. The Unemployment variable was included as 
there is evidence in Okun’s Law that there is a relationship between unemployment and 
GDP growth. I first use unemployment as an explanatory variable to investigate its effect 
on real GDP growth. I then use it as a dependent variable in a difference-in-differences 
regression to analyze the impact the IMF loans have on unemployment.  
The Inflation variable refers to inflation based on consumer prices as an annual 
percentage change, and it is reported by the IMF in its International Financial Statistics. 
Inflation was included in the model since there is evidence that high inflation (above 8%) 
can negatively affect GDP growth (Sarel,1995). The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
variable reports the total “direct investment equity flows in the reporting economy” in a 
particular year and it is reported by the IMF in its balance of payments database (World 
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Bank). The Real Interest Rate variable represents the lending interests rate adjusted for 
inflation. It is calculated by the IMF using data from the World Bank on the GDP deflator. 
It was included as interest rates affect investment, and hence, GDP growth.  
The last two variables are a one-year lag and a two-year lag on IMF participation 
to determine if drawing funds from the IMF has a lagged effect on growth. This could be 
the case since many changes in macroeconomic policy have delayed effects on economic 
growth. Other variables were also considered for the model but were discarded due to low 
statistical significance and lack of data. 
 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is a problem that has to be addressed in this analysis because the 
explanatory variable, IMF participation, is determined to some extent by the dependent 
variables, real GDP growth, gross capital formation and unemployment. The problem 
comes from the fact that a country is more likely to apply for a loan if it is experiencing 
problems with economic growth. The preexisting conditions of a country can, therefore, 
affect the level of success of an IMF program, as well as they can influence the type of 
program and conditions that the IMF is going to require of the country.   
Many statistical approaches have been used to control for endogeneity such as 
instrumental variables (Dreher, 2006). For my study, I have decided to pursue a model that 
considers the treatment effect of IMF intervention using difference-in-differences 
estimation to compare the effects of being in an IMF program (also referred to in my 
analysis as drawing funds from the IMF) to the counterfactual situation of not participating 
in an IMF program. This allows me to study the time trend of growth for each of my three 
dependent variables, had none of the matched countries in the sample participated in a 
program.  I am also able to analyze the effects of participation in IMF programs in groups 
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of countries that have similar characteristics, by comparing the effects of the IMF loans on 
countries that took out credit with countries that did not draw credit from the IMF for every 
year in my study. Therefore, the model allows me to draw conclusions as to whether 
countries would have been better off by not participating in the programs. My difference-
in-differences models include a treatment group (countries that drew funds from the IMF) 
and a control group (countries that did not draw funds from the IMF).  
If I do not control for endogeneity, then my estimated coefficients would be biased 
due to the a priori inequivalent characteristics of the control and treatment groups, as well 
as the issue of self-selection to IMF programs (Basinger, 2010). The problem lies in 
“separating the effect of a treatment from [the control group] due to non-comparability 
between the average units in each treatment group” (ibid.). 
In order to control for endogeneity and the non-comparability of the treatment 
group, I first divided the countries in my dataset into ten regional categories. I then plotted 
the real GDP growth for every country in the region along with the average regional GDP 
growth to see if there was a general pattern in the region and if the country division that I 
chose was appropriate. I found that in every region the majority of the countries followed 
a similar pattern in real GDP growth.  
Subsequently, I divided my dataset into high-growth and low-growth countries by 
comparing each country’s average real GDP growth for the period 1980 – 2014 with the 
regional average. If the country had a larger average growth than the region I would 
consider it a high-growth country, and if the country’s average real GDP growth was 
smaller than the regional average I classified it as a low-growth country. The results were 
two datasets, one for high-growth countries and one for low-growth countries. This way, 
the countries in each dataset are comparable, and the issue of endogeneity is addressed. 
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The lists of countries included in the high-growth and low-growth regressions can be found 
in Appendix E.   
I then constructed binary variables for each year in the period 1980 – 2014 and 
interaction variables for IMF participation per country per year to carry out a difference-
in-differences estimation. Lastly, I calculated z-scores for each country by subtracting the 
country’s average growth from the regional growth and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of the region’s real GDP growth. Countries with a z-score larger than three in 
absolute terms where excluded categorized as outliers and excluded from the regressions.  
I then repeated this same methodology for gross capital formation growth and the 
unemployment rate in order to create a panel dataset for high-growth countries and one for 
low-growth countries for each of these two variables.  
Not all of the countries in my initial dataset were included in all of my regressions 
models, but only the countries that had data for all variables of interest for each regression.  
I decided to use this difference-in-differences model because it is not a structural 
or reduced form model, instead, it is a variance decomposition model that merely highlights 
some fraction of movement in the dependent variables at the time of participation in IMF 
programs.  The purpose of my analysis is not to explain the causes for IMF participation’s 
effects of growth, but rather to analyze the counterfactual situation, meaning that I do not 
seek to explain why programs work or do not work, but I am trying to find out whether 
countries are made better off by participating in an IMF program. 
 
Identification Strategy 
In order to find the effect that IMF participation has on real GDP growth, I 
constructed Regression Model 1 using fixed effects to dummy out the individual country 
effects associated with a panel dataset. I constructed Regression Model 2 to test whether 
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IMF participation Granger-causes real GDP growth and Regression Model 3 to test 
whether real GDP growth Granger-causes IMF participation.  
In Model 4, I use difference-in-differences estimators and fixed effects in order to 
compare the real GDP growth between countries that have taken loans from the IMF and 
similar countries that have not taken loans using the two datasets that I created for high-
growth and low-growth countries. This way, the fact that a country exhibited an average 
high or low real GDP growth in the period of time studied and the issue of endogeneity is 
accounted for, hence, I can get better estimators by comparing only countries with a similar 
economic performance.  
Models 5 and 6 use the same methodology as Model 4 to study the effects of IMF 
loan participation on gross capital formation growth and the unemployment rate 
respectively. 
 
Model 1: Fixed Effects Real Gross Domestic Product Growth Regression 
Model 1 includes a sample of 155 countries and 5415 observations. The model to be 
estimated is: 
Real GDP Growthi,t = αi + β1 IMF Participationi,t + β3 IMF Participationi,t-1 
+ β3 IMF Participationi,t-2 + γXi,t + νi,t 
Where the dependent variable is Real GDP Growth in year t, IMF Participationi,t is a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 if a country drew credit from the IMF in year t. The variables 
IMF Participationi,t-1 and IMF Participationi,t-2 are a one and two year lag respectively of 
the variable IMF Participationi,t, and Xi,t represents control variables, which include: 
inflation, unemployment rate, foreign direct investment, gross capital formation growth, 
labor force growth and real interest rate, for country i in year t. These control variables 
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were included since they are all macroeconomic indicators that affect a country’s growth 
performance. 
 
Model 2: IMF Participation Granger-Causing Real GDP Growth Regression. 
       Real  GDP Growtht = β0 + β1 Real GDP Growtht-1 + β2 Real GDP Growtht-2 
+ β3 Real GDP Growtht-3 + α1IMF Participationt-1 + α2IMF Participationt-2 + α3IMF 
Participationt-3 + εt 
Where, the dependent variable is real GDP growth in year t, Real GDP Growtht-1, Real 
GDP Growtht-2 and Real GDP Growtht-3 are lags on the variable Real GDP Growtht. 
 
Model 3: Real GDP Growth Granger-Causing IMF Participation Regression. 
IMF Participationt = ϕ0 + ϕ1IMF Participationt-1 + ϕ2IMF Participationt-2 + ϕ3IMF 
Participationt-3 + δ1Real  GDP Growtht-1 + δ2 Real GDP Growtht-2 + δ3 Real GDP 
Growtht-3  + εt 
Where the dependent variable is IMF Participation in year t.  
 
Model 4: Difference-in-Differences Regression for the Effect of IMF Participation on 
Real GDP Growth. 
Model 4 for will be estimated for three times. The first estimation will include a sample of 
165 countries and 5775 observations. The second and third estimation address the problem 
of endogeneity. The second model includes a sample of 68 high-growth countries and 2380 
observations. The countries included in this regression can be found in Appendix E Table 
1. The third model, a sample of 97 low-growth countries and 3395 observations.  The 
countries included in this regression can be found in Appendix E Table 2. 
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The model to be estimated is: 
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Where the dependent variable is Real GDP Growth for country i from the year 1980 to the 
year 2014, αi is the country-specific fixed-effect for country i, Tt is a binary variable that 
takes a value 1 when the year = t. IMFi,t * Tt represents an interaction variable for IMF 
participation for country i in year t, where IMFi,t is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 
if country i made use of IMF credit in year t. εi,t is a country shock with standard properties. 
 
Model 5: Difference-in-Differences Regression for the Effect of IMF Participation on 
Gross Capital Formation Growth. 
Model 5 for will be estimated for three times. The first estimation will include a 
sample of 145 countries and 5008 observations. The second and third estimation address 
the problem of endogeneity. The second estimation includes a sample of 59 high gross 
capital formation growth countries and 2032 observations. The countries included in this 
regression can be found in Appendix E Table 3. The third estimation, a sample of 86 low 
gross capital formation growth countries and 2976 observations. The countries included in 
this regression can be found in Appendix E Table 4. 
The model to be estimated is: 
∑∑
==
+++=
2014
1980
,,
2014
1980
, *
t
tittit
t
ttiti TIMFTGrowthFormationCapitalGross εγβα  
Where the dependent variable is the growth rate of gross capital formation for country i 
in year t. 
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Model 6: Difference-in-Differences Regression for the Effect of IMF Participation on the 
Unemployment Rate 
Model 6 for will be estimated for three times. The first estimation will include a 
sample of 165 countries and 3960 observations. The second and third estimation address 
the problem of endogeneity. The second estimation includes a sample of 63 high 
unemployment countries and 1512 observations. The countries included in this regression 
can be found in Appendix E Table 5. The third estimation, a sample of 102 low 
unemployment countries and 2448 observations. The countries included in this regression 
can be found in Appendix E Table 6. 
The model to be estimated is: 
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Where the dependent variable is the Unemployment Rate for country i from the year 
1991 to the year 2014. 
All of my models include robust standard errors in order to control for the 
unrestricted heteroscedasticity and autocollinearity that could be present in the results due 
to the nature of the data generation process.  
 
Results 
The regression results of Model 1 are presented in Table 2 in Appendix A. The 
estimated coefficient for the main explanatory variable, IMF Participation, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that there is a strong relationship 
between enrollment in an IMF program and real GDP growth. According to the regression 
results, a country participating in an IMF program is expected to have a real GDP growth 
1.17 percentage points higher than a comparable country holding all else constant. The lags 
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on IMF participation also show a positive effect on real GDP growth, although they are not 
statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the lagged variables suggest that IMF 
participation has a lagged positive effect on economic growth, meaning that countries 
continue to grow as a result of the IMF’s program.  
Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the control variables make intuitive sense. 
Inflation and unemployment have a negative effect on growth and are statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. Gross capital formation 
growth, as expected, has a positive effect on real GDP growth, and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance. The fact that most of the control variables make 
intuitive sense, in terms of the sign of the coefficient and the statistical significance in the 
majority of the variables make the positive sign of the estimated coefficient on IMF 
participation more reliable. 
Table 3 in Appendix A includes the results of the regression for Model 2: IMF 
Participation Granger-Causing Real GDP Growth. Following this regression, I carried out 
an F-test for: 
IMF Participationt-1 = IMF Participationt-2 = IMF Participationt-3 = 0 
This F-test resulted in a p-value of 0.0000, suggesting that IMF Participation 
Granger-causes real GDP growth at the 1% level of significance.  
Table 4 in Appendix A includes the results of the regression for Model 3: Real GDP Growth 
Granger-Causing IMF Participation. Following this regression, I carried out an F-test for: 
Real GDP Growtht-1 = Real GDP Growtht-2 = Real GDP Growtht-3 = 0 
This F-test resulted in a p-value of 0.0100, suggesting that real GDP growth 
Granger-causes IMF Participation at the 1% level of significance.  
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The Granger causality tests, do not prove that IMF participation causes real GDP 
growth, or vice-versa, but they do indicate that there is a significant relationship between 
IMF participation and real GDP growth.  
The results of the difference-in-differences regressions of the effects of IMF 
program participation on real GDP growth, gross capital formation growth, and the 
unemployment rate are shown in Appendices B, C, and D respectively. The first graph for 
each regression shows the estimated time trend, in other words, the trend of growth that 
the countries in the dataset would have followed if none of them would have participated 
in an IMF program. It helps in understanding the effect that IMF participation had, by 
comparing the estimated time trend, to the estimated coefficients of the interaction 
variables that account for participation in an IMF program for the years for the years 
studied.  
Graph 1 in Appendix B shows the estimated time trends for the regression including 
all 165 countries in the dataset. The estimated time trend omits the estimated coefficient 
for the year 1984 to address the issue of multicollinearity.  Graph 2 shows the plotted 
estimated coefficients of the difference-in-differences regression including every country, 
as well as the 95% confidence interval. The estimated coefficients and robust standard 
errors for the regression are shown in Table 1. Both Graph 2 and Table 1 show no clear 
pattern in terms of IMF participation having a positive or negative effect on growth. 
However, the majority of the estimated coefficients are positive, with 24 out of the 35 years 
studied showing positive coefficients. In this first regression, IMF intervention results in a 
0.45% impact on real GDP growth, on average increasing growth in participant countries.  
Eight estimated coefficients are statistically significant, and of the eight, 7 have a positive 
coefficient suggesting that IMF program participation increases real GDP growth, 
particularly after the year 2001, when all countries are considered and endogeneity is not 
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taken into account. To get a better understanding of the statistically significant estimated 
coefficients for the interactions variables I will compare them with the estimated growth 
trend coefficients. The interaction variable for the years 2001 and 2005 are positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, whereas the time trend shows a 
negative value for the year 2001, and a smaller positive coefficient for 2005, suggesting 
IMF participation increased growth in those years. The years 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013 
all show positive estimated coefficients for the interaction variable and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance, whereas the estimated time trends for those years 
all show negative coefficients, suggesting IMF aid was a driver of growth.  The following 
regressions do account for endogeneity by separating countries between high-growth and 
low-growth countries.   
 Graph 3 shows the estimated time trend for high-growth countries. It displays a 
clear pattern of high growth, with most of the observations indicating a positive value, and 
one can easily spot recessionary periods like the crashing of the internet bubble in the early 
2000s followed by an expansionary period that then an economic downturn with the Great 
Recession of 2008. It excludes the reading for the year 1984 to account for 
multicollinearity. Graph 4 shows the plotted estimated coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals for the interaction variables in the high-growth country regression, and the 
estimated coefficients and robust standard errors can be found in Table 2. Amongst the 
high-growth countries, IMF intervention results in a 0.82% impact on real GDP growth, on 
average bolstering growth performance. 22 out of the 35 estimated coefficients show 
positive values, suggesting that high-growth countries in the treatment group had a larger 
real GDP growth than other high-growth countries in the control group for most years, all 
else held constant. Moreover, of the 35 variables, nine are statistically significant, and all 
nine indicate that IMF participation for those years yielded a higher growth for countries 
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in the treatment group. The estimated coefficients of the interaction variables for the years 
2001, 2005, 2012, 2013, are all statistically significant and larger in value than those of the 
estimated growth trends, suggesting that countries that drew funds from the IMF in those 
years did better than if they had not done so. The years 2002, 2008, 2009, and 2013 are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and they all show considerably larger values than 
those of the estimated growth trend, suggesting countries were made better off by taking 
loans.  
Graph 5 shows the estimated time trends for low-growth countries. The growth 
pattern shows a positive growth for most years, although it shows more periods of recession 
than does the estimated time trend for high-growth countries. It excludes the year 1983 to 
address the problem of multicollinearity.  Graph 6 shows the plotted estimated coefficients 
for low-growth countries and Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients and robust 
standard errors for interaction variables. Amongst the low-growth countries, IMF 
intervention results in a 0.20% impact on real GDP growth, on average showing a small 
positive impact. Graph 6 shows that for most of the time period 1980 – 2000, low growth 
countries that drew funds from the IMF had a lower growth than comparable countries that 
did not draw credit from the IMF with the exceptions of 1981, 1985, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 
1997. After the year 2000, 11 out of the 14 interaction variables show a positive effect on 
growth.  
Furthermore, of the five statistically significant variables, four show positive 
coefficients, suggesting that in the late 2000s and early 2010s low-growth countries that 
participated in IMF program experienced a larger real GDP growth than comparable 
countries, all else held constant. The estimated coefficient for the interaction variable for 
the year 1994 is statistically significant at the 10% level and is larger in magnitude than the 
estimated time trend, suggesting that for that year IMF participation reduced real GDP 
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growth in low-growth countries. However, for the year 2008, the estimated coefficient of 
the interaction variable is statistically significant at the 5% level, and larger than the 
estimated trend, showing a positive effect of the IMF loan on growth. For the years 2009, 
2012, and 2013, the estimated coefficients of the interaction variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the time trend for these years is negative, 
suggesting a strong positive effect of IMF loans for these years.  
The results of the difference-in-differences regressions of the effects of IMF 
program participation on gross capital formation growth can be found in Appendix C. 
Graph 1 shows the estimated time trend for 145 countries included in the dataset. It omits 
the reading for the year 1993 to account for multicollinearity. The graph shows that in most 
years the aggregate of countries experiences a reduction in gross capital formation with a 
very sharp decline during the Great Recession of 2008.  
Graph 2 displays the plotted estimated coefficients of the interaction variables for 
the regression that includes all 145 countries and the values of the estimated coefficients, 
as well as the robust standard errors, can be found in Table 1. The results show that for 25 
out of the 35 years included in the regression, IMF participation increased gross capital 
formation, compared to countries that did not participate in a program. The mean value of 
the estimated coefficients for the interaction variables shows an average 2.21%, increase 
for countries that participated in IMF programs. Moreover, four out of the six statistically 
significant variables show that the countries in the treatment group experienced a higher 
growth of gross capital formation than those in the treatment group. However, as discussed 
with the real GDP growth regression, the results are biased because the endogeneity 
problem is not being addressed.  
The estimated time trends for the high gross capital formation growth regression 
are shown in Graph 4. The graph omits the year 1983 to address the issue of 
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multicollinearity. The estimated time trends show that for high-growth countries, every 
year in the time period 1980 – 2014, except for 1992 and 2009, are associated with large 
positive levels of growth in gross capital formation.  The estimated coefficients for the 
high-growth regression are plotted in Graph 4 and listed in Table 2, along with the robust 
standard errors. Amongst the high-growth countries, IMF intervention results in a 5.20% 
impact on gross capital formation growth, on average bolstering growth performance. The 
results show that for 26 out of the 35 years studied, high-growth countries in the treatment 
group experienced higher levels of growth than similar countries in the control group. 
Table 2 also shows that 6 out of the 8 statistically significant variables are associated with 
higher growth in gross capital formation for countries in the treatment group. The 
interaction variables for the years 1980, and 2014 has larger estimated coefficient than the 
time trend and are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively, suggesting 
that high-growth countries that drew credit from the Fund in those years experienced a 
considerably larger growth.  
The estimated coefficients for interaction variable of the years 1989 and 1998 show 
negative coefficients, and are statistically significant at the 10% level, whereas the time 
trends for those years, show positive coefficients, meaning IMF participation hindered 
growth in those years. Lastly, the interaction variables for the years 1995, 2001, and 2002 
showed larger estimated coefficients the estimated time trend, and are statistically 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting countries were better off making use of IMF credit. 
The estimated time trends for the low gross capital formation growth regression are 
shown in Graph 5. It shows that most years are associated with growth in gross capital 
formation, although the values show smaller growth than the high-growth estimated time 
trends. Graph 5 excludes the year 1983 to account for multicollinearity. The results of the 
low-growth gross capital formation regression are shown in Graph 6 and Table 3. Amongst 
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the low-growth countries, IMF intervention results in a 0.18% impact on gross capital 
formation growth, on average increasing growth performance. 15 interaction variables 
show a negative effect on growth for low gross capital formation growth countries that in 
the treatment group while 20 show a positive value. Of the seven variables that are 
statistically significant, five are associated with a higher growth for countries in the 
treatment group, compared to similar countries in the control group.  
The estimated coefficients of the interaction variables for the years 1980 and 1998 
show a negative value, and are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively, whereas the time trend for those years show a positive value, 
indicating that countries in the treatment group experienced a lower growth those years.  
The coefficients for the interaction variables of the years 1998, 2012, and 2014 are 
statistically significant at the 5% level and larger than the estimated time trends, suggesting 
IMF participation fostered growth for the treatment group in those years. Lastly, the 
interaction variable for the year 2009 is statistically significant at the 1% level and shows 
a large positive value, whereas the time trend for the same year shows a large negative 
value, suggesting countries experience a considerably larger growth of gross capital 
formation as a result of making use of IMF credit that year.  
Appendix D contains the results of the difference-in-differences regressions for the 
study of the effect of IMF participation on unemployment. Graph 1 displays the estimated 
time trends for the first regression including all 165 countries in the dataset for this 
regression. It excludes the year 2014 to account for multicollinearity. The estimated 
coefficients of the interaction variables for the first regression are plotted in Graph 2 and 
listed along with the robust standard errors in Table 1. In this first regression, IMF 
intervention results in a 1.47% increase in the unemployment rate, on average hampering 
growth performance. Graph 2 shows that when all the countries are taken into 
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consideration, IMF program participation increases unemployment, with every year 
displaying a positive value, and 18 out of the 24 estimated coefficients being statistically 
significant. All of the 19 statistically significant interaction coefficients show that would 
have had a smaller increase in the unemployment rate if countries would not have 
participated in IMF programs, with 10 of them showing that the unemployment rate would 
have reduced had it not been for the IMF program. 
Graph 3 shows the estimated time trend for high unemployment countries and omits 
the value for the year 2014 to account for multicollinearity. Graph 4 displays the estimated 
coefficients and the 95% confidence interval for the high unemployment country 
regression. Table 2 lists the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors for the 
regression. Amongst the high-growth countries, IMF intervention results in a 1.47% 
increase in the unemployment rate, on average hindering growth performance. The results 
show how in high unemployment countries; IMF participation is associated with a higher 
unemployment compared to similar countries in the control group.  13 out of the 24 
estimated coefficients for the interaction variables are statistically significant, with 5 
showing the growth in the unemployment rate would have been smaller, and 8 showing 
unemployment would have reduced had it not been for participation in IMF programs. The 
results suggest that the claim that IMF participation leads to higher rates in high 
unemployment countries can be made with a high degree of statistical significance.  
The estimated time trends for the low unemployment country difference-
indifferences regression are plotted in Graph 5 where the year 2011 is excluded to account 
for multicollinearity. The results of the regression are plotted in Graph 6 and listed along 
with the robust standard errors in Table 3. Amongst the high unemployment countries, IMF 
intervention results in a 1.04% increase in the unemployment rate, on average dampening 
growth performance. 12 out of the 24 estimated coefficients showing statistical 
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significance and are associated with IMF participation increasing unemployment. When 
comparing the estimated coefficients for the statistically significant interaction variables 
with the time trends the results show that countries would have experienced a decrease in 
in unemployment in the absence of IMF loans.  
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IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
My regression models cannot show unequivocally whether IMF participation is a 
driver of economic growth. In high-growth countries, my results show that IMF 
participation leads to higher levels of growth both in terms of real GDP and gross capital 
formation. However, in low-growth countries, IMF participation does not yield a marked 
difference from the trend. My results for the regression concerning the unemployment rate 
do provide a precise response, which is that IMF participation leads to higher 
unemployment rates. My results also give an understanding of the IMF as a changing 
institution in the period 1980 – 2014. In the 35-year period studied in this thesis, the Fund 
has been characterized by different approaches to policy that yielded different results for 
growth in participant countries.  
The focus of my study are the difference-in-differences regressions outlined in 
Models 4, 5, and 6. However, I decided to introduce the issue of the effects of IMF 
participation on economic growth by carrying out a fixed effects regression. I used control 
variables, including the two other dependent variables, gross capital formation growth and 
the unemployment rate, in order to first study whether these two variables are determinants 
of growth in real GDP. I found, as I expected, that gross capital formation growth has a 
positive effect on real GDP growth, that the unemployment rate has a negative effect on 
growth, and that the claim could be made with statistical significance. This regression on 
a reduced form model was an important step since it gave me grounds to then pursue my 
difference-in-differences estimation of those two indicators as dependent variables to 
analyze how IMF participation affects them. This step then allowed me to make 
assumptions about what the results of the difference-in-differences regressions on these 
indicators as dependent variables would imply for economic growth. It is important to 
stress, however, that I had to be careful when making these assumptions since this reduced 
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form model does not account for the endogeneity inherent in any estimation of the effects 
of IMF participation on growth and, therefore, the estimated coefficients are biased. 
When designing my models to test the effects of IMF participation on growth, I 
first thought of real GDP growth as the most common measurement for a country’s growth 
performance. I then thought of other variables that could be influenced by IMF 
participation, which are linked to real GDP, namely, gross capital formation and 
unemployment. Gross capital formation growth refers to the “outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories” (World Bank). 
My rationale for including gross capital formation as a dependent variable was that it 
measures the level of investment in the economy. Investment is an important component 
of GDP, and it is assumed that high levels of investment yield positive results in the 
economic performance of a country. The IMF, as part of its conditionality, urges countries 
to invest in aspects such as infrastructure. IMF conditionality also requires countries to 
liberalize flows of foreign direct investment and to observe property rights in order to foster 
a healthy climate for investment. On the other hand, there are those who argue that “IMF 
packages have also been associated with negative social outcomes such as reduced 
investment in public health and education” (The Bretton Woods Project). Therefore, I 
wanted to evaluate whether participation leads to higher levels of investment on capital in 
participant countries. The growth resulting from increases in investment on capital may not 
necessarily reflect immediately in the real GDP growth and, therefore, I thought it would 
be necessary to estimate the yearly effect that IMF participation had on the formation of 
capital.  
With regard to unemployment, my rationale for including it as a dependent variable, 
and a measurement of growth performance, was that it is generally assumed in 
macroeconomics that as a country’s GDP grows; the country moves closer to full 
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employment. Therefore, I wanted to study whether the growth in GDP achieved through 
IMF participation is also reflected in the general welfare of the population, meaning a lower 
level of unemployment.  I also decided to include unemployment as a dependent variable 
since IMF packages urge countries to exercise fiscal responsibility and the neoliberal idea 
of reducing the size of the state. The result of this policy recommendation is that many 
bureaucrats get laid off, and the levels of unemployment rise. Furthermore, from a 
radicalist standpoint, one can argue that policy recommendations such as privatization, the 
liberalization FDI, and a respect for property rights can reflect higher levels of growth in 
GDP, but that growth benefits only the most powerful members of the society, namely, the 
owners of the means of production. The rich are the ones that benefit from the free market 
model, whereas the most disenfranchised members of society suffer from high 
unemployment and a rise in the price of essential goods due to privatization.   
In Models 4, 5, and 6 I first include a regression that does not account for 
endogeneity so that the reader can see the difference in the results between a model that 
does not account for endogeneity and the results once endogeneity is accounted for. In all 
three models, the results of the high-growth and low-growth regressions are different from 
the results of the regression including all the countries in the dataset, suggesting that the 
endogeneity problem was accounted for. In the following part of the discussion, I focus 
only on the regressions that do account for endogeneity. 
With regard to real GDP growth, both the regression for high-growth and for low-
growth countries show a majority of the years studied having a positive effect on growth. 
One could claim by this that when considering an extended period of time, the IMF has 
done more good than harm on participant countries. For high growth countries, 63% of the 
observations show a positive effect, which is a big enough percentage to claim that at least 
a majority of high-growth countries do benefit from making use of IMF funds. It is 
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understandable that there should be some exceptions to the norm since not all high-growth 
countries go into an IMF program with the same a priori characteristics, but rather my 
study controls only for the growth pattern. For the low-growth real GDP regression, 51% 
of the observations show a positive effect on growth. The results indicate that IMF 
participation is less efficient in increasing real GDP growth than in low-growth countries 
than in high-growth ones. I believe this is due to Bird’s (1996) finding that countries 
experiencing economic problems only turn to the IMF as a last resort when the economic 
conditions are extremely dire, and they are willing to face the Fund’s conditionality. The 
positive average of 0.20% growth for the low-growth countries in the treatment group 
suggests a level of success for the IMF’s conditionality, since regardless of the adverse 
conditions in which a country enters an IMF program, the overall result is positive.  
The fact that roughly half the time the effects of drawing fund from the IMF can 
reduce real GDP growth might make a country worry about taking on loans, and this would 
be understandable.  This being said, the country should look at the pattern shown in Graph 
6 in Appendix B. The graph shows how IMF programs yielded higher results after the year 
2000 and low-growth countries have continued to benefit from IMF programs in terms of 
real GDP growth since the 2000s.  This difference in growth patterns can be attributed to 
the changing nature of the IMF. In the year 1999, the Fund introduced the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), a loan program aimed at increasing growth by 
providing a conditionality that is “more accommodating to higher public expenditure, in 
particular pro-poor spending” (IMF). The graph allows us to see how the adoption of such 
a program and the changing approach of the IMF has yielded positive results after the year 
2000. Therefore, a low-growth country that is currently debating whether to enter a 
program should not look at the effects that the Fund’s approach had in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but should rather focus on the Fund’s current approach and the positive results that the 
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Fund’s policies are yielding. The same can be said for a high-growth country that is 
currently deciding whether to draw Funds from the IMF. Graph 4 in Appendix B also 
shows that in the period 1980 – 2000, the effects of drawing funds from the IMF are very 
small or even negative, however, after the year 2000, all of the results are positive except 
for the year 2014. These results also show the changing nature of the IMF and the increased 
level of success that the institution is having in its approach to lending.  
With regard to gross capital formation growth, the results are even stronger in terms 
of the percentage of years that yielded a positive effect of IMF participation, although they 
are weaker regarding statistical significance. For the high-growth regression, I found that 
IMF participation produced a higher growth for countries the drew funds from the IMF in 
74% of the estimated coefficients. This high percentage suggests that for high-growth 
countries making use of IMF was very beneficial in terms of allowing the country to invest 
in capital. Graph 4 in Appendix C clearly shows a pattern of high growth for the countries 
included in the regression, with very few years showing negative values. These results 
should incentivize countries to take loans from the IMF to boost investment in capital.  
The low-growth country regression also shows a positive trend, with 57% of the 
estimated coefficients showing a higher growth for countries in the treatment group, 
compared to similar countries in the control group. As with the real GDP regression, we 
see that the beneficial effects are smaller for countries that are characterized by a low 
average growth in gross capital formation. This is to be expected given the unknown 
country conditions that have made these countries exhibit a low-growth pattern in the time 
period studied.   
The conclusion reached from the regressions on gross capital formation growth is 
that when studying a large group of countries over an extended period of time, IMF 
participation overall had more of a positive than a negative effect in promoting the 
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formation of capital. My results are not consistent with Vreeland’s (2003) finding that 
country’s capital stocks are reduced when a country is enrolled in an IMF program. I 
believe this inconsistency comes from the fact that I am studying a larger period and a 
bigger group of countries. The reason for countries in both the high-growth and the low-
growth groups exhibiting different results also has to do with the a priori characteristics of 
the countries under which they started an IMF program. For instance, if the reason why a 
country applied for an IMF loan is that the country had a balance of payments crises where 
the country was failing to pay its foreign debt or did not have enough foreign currency to 
pay for imports. The country is not going to use the credit provided by the IMF to invest in 
capital but rather, the country would use it for the most immediate need, namely, paying 
its debt obligations.  
When asking the question of whether IMF participation does more good than harm 
it is important to compare my results for high-growth and low-growth countries, both in 
terms of real GDP growth and gross capital formation and ask what are the effects that 
conditionality is having on these two sets of countries. The IMF is clearly more efficient at 
handling a crisis when it takes place in a country characterized by a high-growth pattern. 
One could argue that this phenomenon is due to the IMF placing more trust in countries 
that traditionally exhibit high-growth patterns, which translates into a more lenient 
conditionality attached to the loans granted. These lenient terms of conditionality might 
make a country less worried about approaching the IMF for help, and the IMF can, 
therefore, intercede in the country at the early stages of a crisis. When a country faces an 
economic problem such as a balance of payments crisis, the longer it waits to ask for 
liquidity, the worse the situation is going to get for the country. Low-growth countries see 
the IMF as a lender of last resort due to the fear of conditionality. Therefore, strict 
conditionality acts as a deterrent that prevents countries from making use of the Fund at 
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the beginning of a crisis. The outcome of this deterrence effect is that countries will first 
try to solve the crisis on their own, which without the proper guidance could sink the 
country further into crisis. The IMF should, therefore, change its approach to conditionality 
so that countries in crisis do not fear turning to the institution. By this, I do not mean that 
the IMF should abandon conditionality, on the other hand, I believe that conditionality can 
be good, but it has to be country specific and with less emphasis on a free market 
fundamentalist, neoliberal approach. We now know that while neoliberalism in economics 
and international relations can work very well in some countries, it does not have the same 
outcomes in every country where the system is applied. Emerging economies such as 
China, show that a country can achieve economic development without following the 
traditional neoliberal view of how a free market should look. The IMF should first strive 
to listen to a country’s leadership, why they believe the crisis took place, the steps that they 
would like to take to solve the situation. Then the IMF should work along with the 
country’s officials in coming up with a solution, in which both parties have to compromise 
to some extent.  
The results of the difference-in-differences regressions of the effects IMF 
participation on unemployment are the most conclusive and the most reliable in term of 
statistical significance. Graph 4 in Appendix D shows a clear pattern of IMF program 
participation resulting in higher unemployment rates for high unemployment countries, 
with almost every year in the sample displaying higher unemployment rates for participant 
countries. In this regression, more than half of the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant, which makes the conclusion that IMF programs result in higher unemployment 
rates for countries characterized by a high average unemployment rate reliable.  
The results of the regression on low unemployment countries results in a similar 
conclusion, with countries in the treatment group exhibiting higher unemployment rates 
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than comparable countries in the control group. The estimated coefficients, however, are 
smaller for the low unemployment regression than those of the high unemployment 
regression suggesting that the endogeneity is being accounted for since the controlled a 
priori characteristic of the average unemployment rate is manifested in the results. My 
results for the unemployment results are consistent with the findings in Vreeland (2003). 
The case of unemployment is particularly interesting given the relationship that 
exists between real GDP growth and unemployment. Recall that I find that participation 
leads to higher growth for high-growth countries, most of the time. The convey that for 
low real GDP growth countries 51% of the years studied yielded a higher growth than was 
experienced in comparable countries in the control group. However, my results for 
unemployment suggest that in the period 1991-2014, IMF participation resulted in higher 
unemployment. Here, my results demonstrate one of the greatest criticisms of the IMF. 
 The IMF, as part of the conditionality attached to the loans, requires governments 
to reduce government spending, which includes reducing the size of the state, resulting in 
a substantial amount of public employees being laid off or public spending projects being 
dismantled. Therefore, my results of the unemployment regression can be attributed to the 
conditionality imposed by the IMF. The country might exhibit a real GDP growth rate 
larger than comparable countries in the control group, but it does so at the expense of the 
country’s population – the most affected sector in the country and the one that has the least 
blame for the countries economic downturn.  
The dichotomy between my results for the growth variables and unemployment 
illustrate a need for a change in the approach used for conditionality. The IMF should not 
measure success by growth in the GDP or by the fact that a country exhibits a stable balance 
of payments following a program, but rather should be focused on how are the policies 
affecting not just the growth indicators, but also the people.  
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Developing countries, tend to have very unequal societies with very small ruling 
elites, and the largest segment of the population being poor and uneducated. When the IMF 
advocates for neoliberal policies such as privatization and deregulation, the already 
empowered elites see their share of the country’s profits drastically increase. They have 
the resources to buy the newly privatized resources, they have the capital to invest, many 
of them, being educated abroad, even have the contacts to drive foreign investment into 
their industries.  The economic actions taken by the country’s elites once economic 
conditions are more stable, and they feel confident investing, multiplies their profits and 
make the country even more unequal than it was prior to privatization and a neoliberal 
approach to economic policy.  
The estimated coefficients over time illustrate, however, that the IMF programs 
tend to have a long term negative impact on employment rates in the economy, whether 
due to lower labor participation, or because of less job creation over time by the ruling 
elites. Hence, the real GDP of a country might increase. Real GDP, however, is an 
aggregate indicator that does not reveal anything about how this newly generated income 
is being distributed in a country. From a liberal perspective, one could argue that even if it 
is mostly the rich that are benefitting from the economic expansion of a country, the poor 
also benefit from the overall growth in absolute terms. This means that the poor are made 
better off since the expansion of capital and growth creates better-paying jobs for poor 
people. However, my results demonstrate that this is not the case in countries that 
participated in IMF loans. Industrialization many times does not mean more jobs, but rather 
more automatization processes that reduce the need for unskilled labor. I would argue that 
the disenfranchised people in a crisis-struck country are less concerned with the liberal idea 
or absolute gains, and more concerned with the realist idea of relative gains, as they see the 
rich getting significantly richer, and their situation showing only marginal improvements.   
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My thesis adds value to the existing literature on the effects of IMF loans on 
participant countries, showing that when using a model that considers the treatment effect 
of IMF intervention by decomposing the time variance, high-growth countries have an 
overall positive effect on real GDP growth, while low-growth countries have a smaller 
average positive effect. The model also showed the same trend for gross capital formation 
growth, with high-growth countries having a mostly positive effect, and low-growth 
countries having a smaller positive average effect. My study confirms the validity of the 
critique of the IMF that argues that participation leads to higher unemployment rates in 
participant countries. 
 I find with neoliberals that there is a need for international institutions that promote 
cooperation in the international system. Without institutions such as the IMF to provide the 
necessary assistance in a time of crisis, countries would not have any other entity to aid 
them in dealing with the crisis situation.  
This being said, the difference in my results for high-growth and low-growth 
countries give grounds to the radicalist critique that argues for changes in the status quo of 
the system. As my interpretation of the “Called Bluff” game theory model shows, weak 
countries have no bargaining power when it comes to dealing with the IMF and are forced 
to accept the conditionality attached to the loans. I allow that there is a need for 
conditionality because it is likely that if a country receives a loan but does not change the 
structural problems in its economy that lead to the crisis, the situation is only going to 
present itself again. The change that I argue for is in the relations between the Fund and 
the weak country. The Fund has to pay closer attention to the needs and wants of the crisis-
stricken country and aim at achieving a conditionality program for which both parties can 
agree on and in which both parties have to compromise on some of their original proposals.   
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Appendix A: Table of Descriptive Statistics and Regression Models for Regression 
Models 1, 2, and 3. 
 
 
 
  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Real GDP 
Growth 
3.130341 5.837556 -64.0471 106.2798 
IMF 
Participation 
0.547134 0.497816 0 1 
Labor Force 
Growth 
8.154953 463.3611 -98.8144 35412.01 
Inflation (CPI) 27.88393 392.7406 -18.1086 23773.13 
Unemployment 9.252706 8.24658 0.20 60 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
4400000000 23600000000 -57400000000 734000000000 
Real Interest 
Rate 
4.934439 15.82179 -97.8121 789.799 
Gross Capital 
Formation 
Growth 
4.510794 60.40207 -2562.39 2836.958 
Lag IMF 
Participation 1 
0.547228 0.497807 0 1 
Lag IMF 
Participation 2 
0.547322 0.497798 0 1 
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Table 2 
Fixed Effects Gross Domestic Product Growth Regression Results 
 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1.1736a 0.2789 
Inflation (CPI) -0.0007b 0.0004 
Unemployment -0.1125a 0.0311 
Foreign Direct Investment 0.0000 0.0000 
Gross capital Formation Growth 0.0071c 0.0042 
Labor Force Growth -0.0002a 0.0000 
Real Interest Rate 0.0109 0.0146 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program1 
0.1191 0.1622 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program2 
0.1179 0.1585 
 
Constant 3.3902a 0.3370 
R-squared 0.0969  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0689  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3 
Regression for IMF Participation Granger Causing Real GDP Growth Results. 
 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Lagged Real GDP growth1 0.1224a 0.0298 
Lagged Real GDP growth2 0.0429 0.0298 
Lagged Real GDP growth3 0.0878a 0.0298 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program1 
0.8005b 0.3498 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program2 
1.1068a 0.3499 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program3 
0.8826 b 0.3498 
 
Constant 1.5779 0.3704 
R-squared 0.0105  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0095  
 
Superscripts a, b indicate statistically significant at 1%, and 5% level respectively. 
 
Table 4 
Regression for Real GDP Growth Granger Causing IMF Participation. 
 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program1 
0.0667a 0.0131 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program2 
0.0631a 0.0131 
Lagged Country in IMF 
Program3 
0.0325b 0.0131 
Lagged Real GDP growth1 0.0014 0.0011 
Lagged Real GDP growth2 0.0017 0.0011 
Lagged Real GDP growth3 0.0029a 0.0011 
 
Constant 0.4398a 0.0139 
R-squared 0.0137  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0127  
 
Superscripts a, b indicate statistically significant at 1%, and 5% level respectively. 
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Appendix B: Results for the Difference-in-differences Regressions for the Effects of 
IMF Loan Participation on Real GDP Growth  
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Estimated Time Trend for High Real GDP Growth Growth Countries
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Estimated Coefficients for Low Real GDP Growth DID Regression
Estimated	Coefficient 95%	C.I. 95%	C.I.
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Table 1:  
Difference-in-differences Regression for All Country Real GDP Growth 
   
Variable Estimated Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1980 -1.3089 0.9562 
IMF Participation 1981 1.2516 0.9216 
IMF Participation 1982 0.4178 0.8790 
IMF Participation 1983 -0.3914 0.8294 
IMF Participation 1984 -0.8010 0.8139 
IMF Participation 1985 0.4635 0.7339 
IMF Participation 1986 0.3566 0.7582 
IMF Participation 1987 0.1907 0.7898 
IMF Participation 1988 -1.2978 0.8954 
IMF Participation 1989 -1.2184 0.9561 
IMF Participation 1990 -1.8003 1.3902 
IMF Participation 1991 1.8647 1.2732 
IMF Participation 1992 0.2717 1.5781 
IMF Participation 1993 0.1569 1.3269 
IMF Participation 1994 -2.3026c 1.3358 
IMF Participation 1995 -0.5367 0.9449 
IMF Participation 1996 0.0088 0.6276 
IMF Participation 1997 0.7238 1.4114 
IMF Participation 1998 -1.1516 0.9513 
IMF Participation 1999 -0.5504 0.7599 
IMF Participation 2000 -0.9409 0.6808 
IMF Participation 2001 1.4472c 0.7462 
IMF Participation 2002 1.4090 0.8298 
IMF Participation 2003 1.6732 1.2169 
IMF Participation 2004 0.2574 1.2235 
IMF Participation 2005 1.4334c 0.7900 
IMF Participation 2006 0.6839 0.8536 
IMF Participation 2007 1.1357 0.7727 
IMF Participation 2008 3.0594a 0.7295 
IMF Participation 2009 4.8715a 0.7619 
IMF Participation 2010 0.9604 0.7110 
IMF Participation 2011 1.5867b 0.7320 
IMF Participation 2012 2.4306a 0.6738 
IMF Participation 2013 2.4843a 0.7510 
IMF Participation 2014 -1.9982 2.2753 
   
Constant 3.1616a 0.5033 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0757 
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 2 
Difference-in-differences Regression for High Growth Country Real GDP Growth 
 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1980 -2.0767 1.5486 
IMF Participation 1981 0.6781 1.3035 
IMF Participation 1982 2.0083 1.5625 
IMF Participation 1983 0.7694 1.3752 
IMF Participation 1984 -0.8761 1.3616 
IMF Participation 1985 0.7738 1.1961 
IMF Participation 1986 -0.2306 1.1809 
IMF Participation 1987 0.5991 1.2998 
IMF Participation 1988 -2.5540 1.5810 
IMF Participation 1989 -0.5289 1.4059 
IMF Participation 1990 -2.0858 2.5663 
IMF Participation 1991 1.8141 2.1447 
IMF Participation 1992 0.5793 2.3587 
IMF Participation 1993 -0.5613 1.9311 
IMF Participation 1994 -2.3127 2.5399 
IMF Participation 1995 0.0686 1.5527 
IMF Participation 1996 0.0586 0.7972 
IMF Participation 1997 -0.1205 1.1434 
IMF Participation 1998 -1.8235 1.5931 
IMF Participation 1999 -0.2473 1.3288 
IMF Participation 2000 -0.3241 0.9958 
IMF Participation 2001 2.8312b 1.1829 
IMF Participation 2002 3.4658a 1.2962 
IMF Participation 2003 5.5682b 2.3102 
IMF Participation 2004 0.2501 2.7008 
IMF Participation 2005 2.9025b 1.3333 
IMF Participation 2006 2.2995 1.4640 
IMF Participation 2007 1.6253 1.3654 
IMF Participation 2008 4.8193a 1.1050 
IMF Participation 2009 5.5687a 1.3174 
IMF Participation 2010 0.6729 1.2082 
IMF Participation 2011 3.0062a 1.1207 
IMF Participation 2012 2.4369b 1.0122 
IMF Participation 2013 1.7068b 0.8561 
IMF Participation 2014 -2.1502 2.6938 
   
Constant 1.8830b 0.9363 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0845  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3  
Difference-in-differences Regression for Low Growth Country Real GDP Growth 
   
Variables Estimated Coefficients Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1980 -0.7878 1.2105 
IMF Participation 1981 1.6240 1.2926 
IMF Participation 1982 -0.6981 1.1076 
IMF Participation 1983 -1.2903 1.0415 
IMF Participation 1984 -0.8007 0.9794 
IMF Participation 1985 0.1944 0.9280 
IMF Participation 1986 0.7205 1.0025 
IMF Participation 1987 -0.2674 0.9706 
IMF Participation 1988 -0.4651 1.0207 
IMF Participation 1989 -1.7105 1.3038 
IMF Participation 1990 -1.7346 1.6674 
IMF Participation 1991 1.8387 1.5473 
IMF Participation 1992 0.4797 2.0988 
IMF Participation 1993 0.6935 1.8480 
IMF Participation 1994 -2.5946c 1.5513 
IMF Participation 1995 -0.9695 1.3047 
IMF Participation 1996 -0.0485 0.8757 
IMF Participation 1997 1.1867 2.1220 
IMF Participation 1998 -0.7638 1.1372 
IMF Participation 1999 -0.7714 0.9021 
IMF Participation 2000 -1.3492 0.9654 
IMF Participation 2001 0.6042 0.9541 
IMF Participation 2002 0.0705 1.0776 
IMF Participation 2003 -0.7452 1.3433 
IMF Participation 2004 0.2196 1.1535 
IMF Participation 2005 0.4466 0.9074 
IMF Participation 2006 -0.3710 0.9781 
IMF Participation 2007 0.7730 0.8948 
IMF Participation 2008 1.9788b 0.9550 
IMF Participation 2009 4.5252a 0.9595 
IMF Participation 2010 1.2628 0.8814 
IMF Participation 2011 0.8417 0.9828 
IMF Participation 2012 2.4929a 0.9210 
IMF Participation 2013 2.9791a 1.1164 
IMF Participation 2014 -0.4083 0.4666 
   
Constant 1.4869b 0.6882 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0856  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix C: Results for the Difference-in-differences Regressions for the Effects of 
IMF Loan Participation on Gross Capital Formation 
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Table 1 
Difference-in-differences Regression for All Country Gross Capital Formation 
Growth 
Variables Estimated Coefficients Robust Standard Errors 
   
IMF Participation 1980 3.4428 5.2038 
IMF Participation 1981 3.9494 3.8582 
IMF Participation 1982 -0.5000 4.0402 
IMF Participation 1983 -3.9001 3.2248 
IMF Participation 1984 0.2172 3.4659 
IMF Participation 1985 1.2956 3.1051 
IMF Participation 1986 4.7043 4.4798 
IMF Participation 1987 4.5258 3.3390 
IMF Participation 1988 -1.1838 3.5906 
IMF Participation 1989 -6.4704c 3.2899 
IMF Participation 1990 7.7161 4.9626 
IMF Participation 1991 1.3898 3.9133 
IMF Participation 1992 8.0369 5.1609 
IMF Participation 1993 -0.6163 8.3539 
IMF Participation 1994 -7.3127 6.3533 
IMF Participation 1995 4.7324 11.9269 
IMF Participation 1996 2.0358 6.9667 
IMF Participation 1997 -1.3397 7.8758 
IMF Participation 1998 -13.7367b 6.2750 
IMF Participation 1999 4.6226 4.8506 
IMF Participation 2000 10.3530 9.9035 
IMF Participation 2001 2.8411 5.9487 
IMF Participation 2002 3.5244 4.4751 
IMF Participation 2003 2.4735 3.9281 
IMF Participation 2004 3.9464 2.8357 
IMF Participation 2005 -0.6621 2.7472 
IMF Participation 2006 3.9929 3.0530 
IMF Participation 2007 2.8390 2.8573 
IMF Participation 2008 5.2923c 3.1096 
IMF Participation 2009 11.4246a 3.6328 
IMF Participation 2010 4.1287 3.3546 
IMF Participation 2011 -1.1181 2.9695 
IMF Participation 2012 6.1176a 2.3465 
IMF Participation 2013 2.9104 2.0030 
IMF Participation 2014 7.5042a 2.6532 
   
Constant 4.2200 3.6693 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0262  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 78 
 
  
Table 2 
Difference-in-differences Regression for High Gross Capital Formation Growth 
 
Variables Estimated Coefficients Robust Standard Errors 
   
IMF Participation 1980 19.6699b 8.8001 
IMF Participation 1981 8.0674 6.4037 
IMF Participation 1982 6.5606 7.8751 
IMF Participation 1983 -0.3142 5.2132 
IMF Participation 1984 1.2997 6.1177 
IMF Participation 1985 2.7448 5.7045 
IMF Participation 1986 11.2677 8.1426 
IMF Participation 1987 1.6492 5.5292 
IMF Participation 1988 -9.5994 7.3086 
IMF Participation 1989 -12.6672c 7.1810 
IMF Participation 1990 12.9653 9.0134 
IMF Participation 1991 0.1989 6.9206 
IMF Participation 1992 13.0340 8.3386 
IMF Participation 1993 9.1746 16.1288 
IMF Participation 1994 -4.6018 9.2114 
IMF Participation 1995 29.9337c 16.9610 
IMF Participation 1996 13.0249 13.8935 
IMF Participation 1997 -11.7027 12.0054 
IMF Participation 1998 -12.9309c 7.5148 
IMF Participation 1999 10.8073 7.9100 
IMF Participation 2000 25.0918 21.9714 
IMF Participation 2001 9.4055c 5.6148 
IMF Participation 2002 11.8273c 7.0123 
IMF Participation 2003 -2.4868 9.2680 
IMF Participation 2004 7.0089 5.7183 
IMF Participation 2005 -0.5458 5.2264 
IMF Participation 2006 2.1815 5.7176 
IMF Participation 2007 0.0190 5.9232 
IMF Participation 2008 2.3087 6.6819 
IMF Participation 2009 14.3846c 7.7511 
IMF Participation 2010 8.3216 6.9247 
IMF Participation 2011 -6.1437 6.7795 
IMF Participation 2012 4.6576 4.6890 
IMF Participation 2013 3.8017 4.3673 
IMF Participation 2014 13.4244a 2.5334 
   
Constant -7.0490b 3.1613 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0523  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 79 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
Difference-in-differences Regression for Low Gross Capital Formation Growth 
Variables Estimated Coefficients Robust Standard Errors 
   
IMF Participation 1980 -10.3739b 4.2389 
IMF Participation 1981 -1.5773 4.8607 
IMF Participation 1982 -5.0262 4.8346 
IMF Participation 1983 -2.9365 4.1015 
IMF Participation 1984 -1.2288 3.9188 
IMF Participation 1985 -0.0684 3.3050 
IMF Participation 1986 -1.3416 3.7803 
IMF Participation 1987 6.7372 4.7787 
IMF Participation 1988 8.2356b 4.1133 
IMF Participation 1989 1.4616 3.3824 
IMF Participation 1990 2.3556 3.8730 
IMF Participation 1991 0.9235 4.9664 
IMF Participation 1992 6.1652 7.2678 
IMF Participation 1993 -10.9182 7.7610 
IMF Participation 1994 -10.2397 8.7377 
IMF Participation 1995 -17.7306 15.0900 
IMF Participation 1996 -9.0463 6.1570 
IMF Participation 1997 -1.6583 13.4572 
IMF Participation 1998 -17.9627c 9.8717 
IMF Participation 1999 4.4592 7.5145 
IMF Participation 2000 14.5871 16.1341 
IMF Participation 2001 -2.1383 9.1082 
IMF Participation 2002 -0.4625 5.7604 
IMF Participation 2003 4.2557 3.3797 
IMF Participation 2004 2.1769 2.8498 
IMF Participation 2005 0.0467 3.1896 
IMF Participation 2006 4.8236 3.5960 
IMF Participation 2007 4.7689 3.0414 
IMF Participation 2008 7.8011b 3.0372 
IMF Participation 2009 9.9503a 3.6363 
IMF Participation 2010 5.2419 4.4666 
IMF Participation 2011 1.1813 2.8158 
IMF Participation 2012 6.2549b 3.0814 
IMF Participation 2013 1.8561 2.1532 
IMF Participation 2014 5.9013b 2.7408 
   
Constant 0.1357 1.6571 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0370  
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix D: Results for the Difference-in-differences Regressions for the Effects of 
IMF Loan Participation on Gross Capital Formation 
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Table 1 
Difference-in-differences Regression for All Country Unemployment 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1991 1.1529a 0.3680 
IMF Participation 1992 0.9366b 0.3935 
IMF Participation 1993 0.7625c 0.4013 
IMF Participation 1994 0.6182 0.3823 
IMF Participation 1995 0.8675b 0.3843 
IMF Participation 1996 0.7238b 0.3547 
IMF Participation 1997 0.9270a 0.3301 
IMF Participation 1998 0.9848a 0.3270 
IMF Participation 1999 0.8023c 0.4188 
IMF Participation 2000 1.3617a 0.5054 
IMF Participation 2001 1.7138a 0.5826 
IMF Participation 2002 1.5286a 0.5186 
IMF Participation 2003 1.1491c 0.5874 
IMF Participation 2004 1.0138c 0.5886 
IMF Participation 2005 1.3484a 0.5067 
IMF Participation 2006 1.5255a 0.5209 
IMF Participation 2007 1.9654a 0.5045 
IMF Participation 2008 1.5715b 0.6224 
IMF Participation 2009 0.5776 0.4823 
IMF Participation 2010 0.4346 0.4702 
IMF Participation 2011 0.9091c 0.4781 
IMF Participation 2012 0.5070 0.5318 
IMF Participation 2013 0.6091 0.5416 
IMF Participation 2014 3.1131 2.5935 
   
Constant 8.3984c 0.1695 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0154  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Difference-in-differences Regression for High Unemployment Countries 
Variables Estimated Coefficients Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1991 2.3196a 0.7790 
IMF Participation 1992 2.0223b 0.8077 
IMF Participation 1993 1.9811b 0.8407 
IMF Participation 1994 1.2164 0.7685 
IMF Participation 1995 1.6612b 0.8110 
IMF Participation 1996 1.0342 0.7373 
IMF Participation 1997 1.3367b 0.6606 
IMF Participation 1998 1.1582c 0.6543 
IMF Participation 1999 1.1265 0.7957 
IMF Participation 2000 1.8395c 1.0243 
IMF Participation 2001 2.5023b 1.2144 
IMF Participation 2002 2.1262b 1.0334 
IMF Participation 2003 1.7110 1.1959 
IMF Participation 2004 1.4096 1.2166 
IMF Participation 2005 2.1933b 0.9943 
IMF Participation 2006 2.1025b 1.0126 
IMF Participation 2007 2.6893a 0.9238 
IMF Participation 2008 1.4655 1.2957 
IMF Participation 2009 0.6131 0.8410 
IMF Participation 2010 0.9492 0.7913 
IMF Participation 2011 1.7823b 0.7667 
IMF Participation 2012 1.0092 0.9404 
IMF Participation 2013 0.4831 0.9629 
IMF Participation 2014 -1.5560 1.3926 
   
Constant 12.9395a 0.3973 
   
R-Squared Overall = 0.0722  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 
Difference-in-differences Regression for Low Unemployment Countries 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
   
IMF Participation 1991 0.4785 0.3595 
IMF Participation 1992 0.3699 0.3987 
IMF Participation 1993 0.1493 0.3755 
IMF Participation 1994 0.3480 0.3686 
IMF Participation 1995 0.4831 0.3746 
IMF Participation 1996 0.5939 0.3613 
IMF Participation 1997 0.7297c 0.3662 
IMF Participation 1998 0.9035b 0.3652 
IMF Participation 1999 0.6434 0.4501 
IMF Participation 2000 1.1259b 0.4783 
IMF Participation 2001 1.3350a 0.5021 
IMF Participation 2002 1.2335b 0.4970 
IMF Participation 2003 0.8948c 0.5138 
IMF Participation 2004 0.8418c 0.5001 
IMF Participation 2005 0.8350c 0.4892 
IMF Participation 2006 1.1747b 0.5146 
IMF Participation 2007 1.4926a 0.5285 
IMF Participation 2008 1.6199a 0.5492 
IMF Participation 2009 0.5352 0.5694 
IMF Participation 2010 0.0926 0.5725 
IMF Participation 2011 0.3873 0.5683 
IMF Participation 2012 0.2078 0.6189 
IMF Participation 2013 0.7006 0.6357 
IMF Participation 2014 7.7435b 3.3967 
   
Constant 5.6093a 0.4476 
   
R-Squared 0.0220  
 
Superscripts a, b, c indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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E
ast &
 
South E
ast 
A
sia 
South &
 
C
entral 
A
m
erica 
N
orth 
A
frica &
 
M
iddle 
E
ast 
 
N
orth 
A
m
erica 
 
Sub-Saharan A
frica 
 
South A
sia 
 
C
aribbean 
 
A
ustralia/N
ew
 
Z
ealand 
R
egional 
A
verage  
9.55%
 
2.27%
 
7.34%
 
6.27%
 
4.98%
 
3.22%
 
6.04%
 
7.74%
 
3.41%
 
4.49%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
rm
enia 
B
elgium
 
C
am
bodia 
C
hile 
D
jibouti 
C
anada 
B
enin 
Seychelles 
B
angladesh 
D
om
inican 
R
epublic 
A
ustralia 
 
A
zerbaijan 
D
enm
ark 
C
hina 
N
icaragua 
Jordan 
 
B
otsw
ana 
Sudan 
B
hutan 
H
aiti 
 
 
B
ulgaria 
H
ungary 
Lao PD
R
 
Panam
a 
U
nited 
A
rab 
Em
irates 
 
B
urkina Faso 
Tanzania 
India 
 
 
 
G
eorgia 
Iceland 
M
yanm
ar 
Peru 
 
 
B
urundi 
U
ganda 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland 
Tim
or-Leste 
V
enezuela 
 
 
C
had 
Zam
bia 
 
 
 
 
 
Luxem
bourg 
V
ietnam
 
 
 
 
C
ongo, D
em
. 
R
ep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
alta 
 
 
 
 
C
ongo, R
ep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
orw
ay 
 
 
 
 
C
ote d'Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
Equatorial 
G
uinea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sw
eden 
 
 
 
 
Eritrea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
nited K
ingdom
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lesotho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
auritania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
w
anda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senegal 
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T
able 4 
L
ow
 G
ross C
apital Form
ation G
row
th C
ountries by R
egion 
R
egions 
 
E
astern E
urope &
 C
entral 
A
sia 
 
W
estern 
E
urope 
E
ast &
 
South E
ast 
A
sia 
South &
 
C
entral 
A
m
erica 
N
orth 
A
frica &
 
M
iddle 
E
ast 
 
N
orth 
A
m
erica 
Sub-Saharan 
A
frica 
 
South A
sia 
 
C
aribbean 
 
A
ustralia/N
ew
 
Z
ealand 
R
egional 
A
verage  
9.55%
 
2.27%
 
7.34%
 
6.27%
 
4.98%
 
3.22%
 
6.04%
 
7.74%
 
3.41%
 
4.49%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
lbania 
Slovenia 
A
ustria 
B
runei 
D
arussalam
 
A
rgentina 
A
lgeria 
U
nited 
States 
C
am
eroon 
Pakistan 
C
uba 
N
ew
 Zealand 
 
B
elarus 
Tajikistan 
C
yprus 
H
ong K
ong  
B
elize 
Egypt, 
A
rab R
ep. 
 
C
om
oros 
 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
 
C
roatia 
Turkey 
Finland 
Indonesia 
B
olivia 
Iran, 
Islam
ic 
R
ep. 
 
G
abon 
 
 
 
 
C
zech 
R
epublic 
Turkm
enistan 
France 
Japan 
B
razil 
Israel 
 
G
uinea 
 
 
 
 
K
azakhstan 
U
kraine 
G
erm
any 
K
orea, R
ep. 
C
olom
bia 
Lebanon 
 
K
enya 
 
 
 
 
K
osovo 
U
zbekistan 
G
reece 
Papua N
ew
 
G
uinea 
C
osta R
ica 
M
orocco 
 
M
adagascar 
 
 
 
 
K
yrgyz 
R
epublic 
 
Italy 
Philippines 
Ecuador 
Syrian 
A
rab 
R
epublic 
 
M
auritius 
 
 
 
 
Latvia 
 
N
etherlands 
Singapore 
El Salvador 
Tunisia 
 
M
ozam
bique 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
Portugal 
Thailand 
G
uatem
ala 
 
 
N
am
ibia 
 
 
 
 
M
acedonia, 
FY
R
 
 
Sw
itzerland 
 
H
onduras 
 
 
N
igeria 
 
 
 
 
M
oldova 
 
 
 
M
exico 
 
 
South A
frica 
 
 
 
 
M
ontenegro 
 
 
 
Paraguay 
 
 
Sw
aziland 
 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
 
 
U
ruguay 
 
 
Togo 
 
 
 
 
R
om
ania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
ussian 
Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Serbia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slovak 
R
epublic 
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T
able 5 
H
igh U
nem
ploym
ent C
ountries by R
egion 
R
egions 
E
astern 
E
urope &
 
C
entral A
sia 
 
W
estern 
E
urope 
E
ast &
 
South E
ast 
A
sia 
South &
 
C
entral 
A
m
erica 
N
orth 
A
frica &
 
M
iddle 
E
ast 
 
N
orth 
A
m
erica 
Sub-
Saharan 
A
frica 
 
South A
sia 
 
C
aribbean 
 
A
ustralia/N
ew
 
Z
ealand 
R
egional 
A
verage  
12.49%
 
7.53%
 
4.19%
 
7.61%
 
10.49%
 
7.16%
 
9.64%
 
5.90%
 
10.99%
 
6.58%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
lbania 
B
elgium
 
C
hina 
A
rgentina 
A
lgeria 
C
anada 
B
otsw
ana 
A
fghanistan 
B
arbados 
A
ustralia 
 
A
rm
enia 
Finland 
Fiji 
B
elize 
Iran, 
Islam
ic 
R
ep. 
 
G
abon 
M
aldives 
D
om
inican 
R
epublic 
 
 
B
osnia and 
H
erzegovina 
France 
Indonesia 
B
razil 
Iraq 
 
K
enya 
Sri Lanka 
Jam
aica 
 
 
B
ulgaria 
G
erm
any 
M
ongolia 
C
hile 
Jordan 
 
Lesotho 
 
 
 
 
C
roatia 
H
ungary 
Philippines 
C
olom
bia 
Libya 
 
M
auritania 
 
 
 
 
G
eorgia 
Ireland 
Tim
or-
Leste 
G
uyana 
M
orocco 
 
M
ozam
bique 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 
Italy 
 
Panam
a 
Tunisia 
 
N
am
ibia 
 
 
 
 
M
acedonia, 
FY
R
 
Portugal 
 
Surinam
e 
Y
em
en, 
R
ep. 
 
South A
frica 
 
 
 
 
M
ontenegro 
Spain 
 
U
ruguay 
 
 
Sudan 
 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
 
V
enezuela, 
R
B 
 
 
Sw
aziland 
 
 
 
 
Serbia 
 
 
 
 
 
Zam
bia 
 
 
 
 
Slovak 
R
epublic 
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T
able 6 
L
ow
 U
nem
ploym
ent C
ountries by R
egion 
R
egions 
 
E
astern E
urope 
&
 C
entral A
sia 
 
W
estern 
E
urope 
E
ast &
 
South E
ast 
A
sia 
South &
 
C
entral 
A
m
erica 
N
orth 
A
frica &
 
M
iddle 
E
ast 
 
N
orth 
A
m
erica 
 
Sub-Saharan A
frica 
 
South A
sia 
 
C
aribbean 
 
A
ustralia/N
ew
 
Z
ealand 
R
egional 
A
verage  
12.49%
 
7.53%
 
4.19%
 
7.61%
 
10.49%
 
7.16%
 
9.64%
 
5.90%
 
10.99%
 
6.58%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
zerbaijan 
A
ustria 
B
runei 
D
arussalam
 
B
olivia 
Egypt, 
A
rab R
ep. 
U
nited 
States 
A
ngola 
G
uinea 
B
angladesh 
C
uba 
N
ew
 Zealand 
 
B
elarus 
C
yprus 
C
am
bodia 
C
osta R
ica 
Israel 
 
B
enin 
G
uinea-
B
issau 
B
hutan 
H
aiti 
 
 
C
zech R
epublic 
D
enm
ark 
H
ong K
ong  
Ecuador 
K
uw
ait 
 
B
urkina 
Faso 
Liberia 
India 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
 
Estonia 
G
reece 
Japan 
El Salvador 
Lebanon 
 
B
urundi 
M
adagascar 
N
epal 
 
 
 
K
azakhstan 
Iceland 
K
orea, R
ep. 
G
uatem
ala 
O
m
an 
 
C
am
eroon 
M
alaw
i 
Pakistan 
 
 
 
K
yrgyz 
R
epublic 
M
alta 
Lao PD
R
 
H
onduras 
Q
atar 
 
C
abo V
erde 
M
ali 
 
 
 
 
Latvia 
N
etherlands 
M
yanm
ar 
M
exico 
Saudi 
A
rabia 
 
C
entral 
A
frican 
R
epublic 
M
auritius 
 
 
 
 
M
oldova 
N
orw
ay 
Papua N
ew
 
G
uinea 
N
icaragua 
Syrian 
A
rab 
R
epublic 
 
C
had 
N
iger 
 
 
 
 
R
om
ania 
Sw
eden 
Singapore 
Paraguay 
U
nited 
A
rab 
Em
irates 
 
C
om
oros 
N
igeria 
 
 
 
 
R
ussian 
Federation 
Sw
itzerland 
Solom
on 
Islands 
Peru 
 
 
C
ongo, 
D
em
. R
ep. 
R
w
anda 
 
 
 
 
Slovenia 
U
nited 
K
ingdom
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
C
ongo, 
R
ep. 
Senegal 
 
 
 
 
Tajikistan 
 
V
ietnam
 
 
 
 
C
ote 
d'Ivoire 
Sierra 
Leone 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
Equatorial 
G
uinea 
Som
alia 
 
 
 
 
Turkm
enistan 
 
 
 
 
 
Eritrea 
Tanzania 
 
 
 
 
U
kraine 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethiopia 
Togo 
 
 
 
 
U
zbekistan 
 
 
 
 
 
G
am
bia, 
The 
U
ganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
hana 
Zim
babw
e 
 
 
 
